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Bagenstos:

EMPLOYMENT LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY
Samuel R. Bagenstos*
ABSTRACT
What is the normative justification for individual employment
law? For a number of legal scholars, the answer is economic efficiency.
Other scholars argue, to the contrary, that employment law protects
against (vaguely defined) imbalances of bargaining power and
exploitation. Against both of these positions, this paper argues that
individual employment law is best understood as advancing a particular
conception of equality. That conception, which many legal and political
theorists have called social equality, focuses on eliminating hierarchies of
social status. Drawing on the author’s work elaborating the justification
for employment discrimination law, this paper argues that individual
employment law is justified as preventing employers from contributing to
or entrenching social status hierarchies—and that it is justifiable even if it
imposes meaningful costs on employers.
The paper argues that the social equality theory can help us
critique, defend, elaborate, and extend the rules of individual employment
law. It illustrates the point by showing how concerns about social
equality, at an inchoate level, underlie some classic arguments against
employment-at-will. It also shows how engaging with the question of
social equality can enrich analysis of a number of currently salient
doctrinal issues in employment law, including questions regarding how
the law should protect workers’ privacy and political speech, the proper
scope of maximum-hours laws and prohibitions on retaliation, and the
framework that should govern employment arbitration.

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I presented an early
version of this paper at the Seventh Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship
in Labor and Employment Law, and I very much appreciate the comments and
suggestions made by colloquium participants. Thanks as well to Andrea Taylor
and Jennifer Utrecht for their helpful research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the normative justification for individual
employment law?1 Why should the law regulate the employment
relationship in any way distinct from any other contractual
relationship? In order to determine what sorts of regulations the
law should impose on the employment relationship, we need to
answer these questions.

When I refer in this paper to “individual employment law,” or the shorthand
“employment law,” I refer to those legal doctrines that govern the employment
relationship but that do not prohibit group-based discrimination (which would
be “employment discrimination law”) and do not regulate unionization and
collective bargaining (which would be “labor law”). For an argument that
distinctions between these three pillars of workplace law are increasingly
dissolving—a dissolution to which my argument would, at one level,
contribute—see Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of
American Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163 (2007).
1
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For a number of legal scholars, notably Dean Stewart
Schwab and Professor Alan Hyde, the answers to these questions
are straightforward. Individual employment law, these scholars
argue, is justified if, and to the extent that, it serves the goal of
economic efficiency. 2 Employment law rules should thus be
explained, assessed, and if necessary reformed, based on whether
they make labor markets more efficient.
In line with that argument, employment law scholarship
fairly drips with economic-efficiency analysis. The number of
employment law articles relying on economic arguments is far, far
too numerous to cite or even count them all. But let me just note a
couple of telling data points. A leading casebook on employment
law employs economic efficiency as its first “strong unifying
theme[],” and it “attempts to use economics to relate seemingly
disparate issues and to explore issues in a rigorous way.”3 Leading
defenses and critiques of employment law’s baseline principle—the
at-will rule—rely heavily on economic analysis.4 Indeed, one can
find leading scholars offering economic analyses of virtually any
employment-law problem.5 Although much scholarship relating to
particular employment-law issues continues to take the form of
traditional doctrinal analysis, it is fair to say that economic
efficiency provides the only overarching normative theory of
employment law.
See Alan Hyde, What is Labour Law?, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOR
LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 37 (Guy Davidov & Brian
Langille, eds., 2006); Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law:
Reflecting or Refracting Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29 (2001). See also Alan Hyde,
Response to Working Group on Chapter 1 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment
Law: On Purposeless Restatement, 13 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POL’Y J. 87, 89
(2006) (arguing that employment legislation is “typically adopted when market
failures”—such as “inelasticity in the supply of labor; collective action problems
among workers; low trust and opportunism that prevent the formation of
efficient long-term contracts; and information asymmetries”—“prevent atomized
markets from reaching efficient results”).
3 STEVEN L. WILLBORN, STEWART J. SCHWAB, JOHN F. BURTON, JR., & GILLIAN
LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (5th ed. 2012).
4 See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2010); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984); Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics,
and Bad Policy: Time to Retire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901 (1996);
Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 120-122 (2002).
5 For a recent example, see CHRISTINE JOLLS, RATIONALITY AND CONSENT IN
PRIVACY LAW (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing worker
privacy protections). For an older example, see Richard McAdams, Relative
Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 21 (1992) (discussing workplace safety protections).
2
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To the extent that scholars challenge economic efficiency as
the normative justification for employment law, they tend to argue
that the government should regulate the employment relationship
in order to rectify imbalances of bargaining power between
employers and employees.
Employment law, in this view,
“[p]rotect[s] the weaker party to the employment contract” against
“exploit[ation].”6 As I argue below, the asymmetric vulnerability of
(most) employers and (most) workers is an important building
block in justifying employment law. But the concept of unequal
bargaining power is notoriously slippery.7 And the best arguments
for imposing duties on employers focus not on fairness to individual
employees but on the systemic effects—in and out of the
workplace—of allowing employers to engage in particular
practices.
In this paper, I offer a normative theory of individual
employment law that focuses on these sorts of systemic effects.
That theory draws on my earlier work that offered a normative
justification for employment discrimination law. 8 In that earlier
work, I argued that employment discrimination law serves the goal
of advancing social equality. Although employment discrimination
law imposes undeniable costs on employers, I argued that those
costs are justified, because employers can properly be required to
forego some profit in order to avoid contributing to a system of
social inequality.
A very similar argument, I contend, provides a justification
for individual employment law. Individual employment law, I
argue, can be profitably understood as pervasively promoting
social equality. Social equality, as described by a number of
scholars, seeks “a society in which people regard and treat one
another as equals, in other words a society that is not marked by
status divisions such that one can place different people in
hierarchically ranked categories.” 9 Specific employment-law
Stewart J. Schwab, The Law and Economics Approach to Workplace Regulation, in
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 91, 111 (Bruce E.
Kaufman, ed., 1997) (describing the dominant view “[o]utside the law-andeconomics camp”).
7 See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41
MD. L. REV. 563, 615-620 (1982).
8 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 837-870 (2003).
9 David Miller, Equality and Justice, 10 RATIO 222, 224 (1997). For other recent
elaborations of the theory, see Carina Fourie, What is Social Equality? An Analysis
6
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doctrines, I argue, can be profitably elaborated, assessed, and
critiqued by reference to that conception of equality.
When applied to employment discrimination law, the notion
of social equality has had a distinctly group-oriented cast. In my
own work on employment discrimination and social equality, for
example, I argued that antidiscrimination law should be
understood as ensuring that socially salient racial, gender,
disability, or other groups do not experience stigma or systematic
disadvantage. 10 That, I explained, is what justifies the law’s
protection of particular classes and prohibition of particular
classifications.11
But outside of the antidiscrimination precinct, individual
employment law does not protect particular classes or axes of
identity. Its protections are, in an important sense, universal.12 The
social equality that individual employment law can protect is also
universal. It targets not merely those practices that entrench castebased deprivations but also those practices that would tend to
undermine any worker’s status as an equal to his or her employer,
boss, or supervisor.
When we explore the application of
employment law outside of the discrimination context, we will find
that concerns about social equality—although not named as such—
lie at the heart of the questions the doctrine asks and answers.
of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal, 18 RES PUBLICA 107 (2012); T.M.
SCANLON, WHEN DOES EQUALITY MATTER? (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). For a recent application to tort law, see Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse
as Social Equality, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 243 (2011). Other scholars have used the
labels “equal citizenship,” e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—
Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1977); “social citizenship,” e.g., T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS
(1950); William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1
(1999); “democratic citizenship,” e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 276-278 (1983); or “democratic equality,”
e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 289
(1999); to refer to roughly the same idea.
10 See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 839-840.
11 See id. at 846-848.
12 A focus on bolstering the rules of individual employment law thus responds to
calls for universalistic social-welfare interventions, see, e.g., SAMUEL R.
BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT
143-145 (2009), and in particular for interventions in the employment relationship
that focus on social class as much as on other group identities, see, e.g., Forbath,
supra note 9; but cf. Guy Davidov, The Goals of Regulating Work: Between
Universalism and Selectivity, ___ U. TORONTO L.J. ___ (forthcoming) (arguing that
labor and employment law should not entirely abandon the selective approach in
favor of a universalistic one).
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This is not to say that employment law’s rules, as currently
structured, always do promote social equality. Indeed, one of the
benefits of a social-equality focus is that it offers a critical lens
through which we can examine current doctrine. When viewed
through that lens, many of today’s employment-law rules come up
short. But a focus on social equality helps to show that the
seemingly disparate critiques of a wide array of doctrines can be
profitably understood as stemming from the same underlying goal.
Although the general principle of social equality can hardly dictate
answers to specific doctrinal questions, it can orient critiques of the
current doctrine and ground a case for reform. Or so I hope to
show.
I do not, of course, write on a completely clean slate here. In
an article on the diverse philosophical foundations of labor and
employment law, Dean Horacio Spector devoted four pages to
arguing that what he called “equal autonomy”—roughly what I call
social equality—offered one of the more promising normative bases
for regulation of the workplace. 13 My project here also has
undeniable affinities with Professor Noah Zatz’s argument that the
minimum wage—a paradigm individual-employment regulation—
can be justified in civil rights terms. 14 Indeed, Professor Zatz
expressly analogized to my earlier antidiscrimination work in
support of his argument.15 Professor Aditi Bagchi also has argued
for taking social equality into account in employment law, though
she does not offer social equality as an overarching theory of the
law in this area.16 My project has an affinity, too, with Professor
David Yamada’s argument “that human dignity should supplant
‘markets and management’ as the central framework for analyzing
and shaping American employment law,”17—though I think that
See Horacio Spector, Philosophical Foundations of Labor Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1119, 1144-1147 (2006). Professor William Forbath has similarly shown how
ideas of social equality played a crucial role in the adoption of (collective) labor
law in the United States. See Forbath, supra note 9, at 59-60, 69-70.
14 See Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative
to Antipoverty Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 5 (arguing that “ongoing
resistance to economic reductionism in the realm of civil rights—as occurs in
antidiscrimination law—is forging intellectual tools of wider significance” that
help us see that economic “analysis arguably misses the point” when justifying
the minimum wage).
15 See id. at 42-43.
16 See Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 579.
17 David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U. RICH. L.
REV. 523, 524 (2009).
13
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social equality, rather than the more multifaceted concept of human
dignity, offers a more helpful organizing principle. 18 And it
resonates with Professor Richard Michael Fischl’s argument that
“forthrightly pursuing [workplace law] reform in the name of
social values such as democratic and humane ordering” is “a more
promising starting point than casting our lot with the supposed
laws of supply and demand.”19 But this paper represents, I think,
the first systematic effort to describe and defend a social equality
theory of individual employment law and to sketch its implications
for an array of employment-law doctrines.
My argument proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the basic
normative argument for a social equality theory of employment
law. In that part, I first describe the notion of social equality and
defend it as an attractive conception of equality. I then turn to
examining what sorts of social and institutional practices social
equality demands. Finally, I discuss some important limitations of
the social equality principle, with a particular focus on employers’
interests in avoiding costly regulation.
Part II examines how social equality can help us understand,
explain, and critique a wide variety of employment-law doctrines.
In that part, I first show how social equality concerns underlie some
classic critiques of the employment-at-will rule. I then explain how
social equality illuminates a number of enduring and currently hot
debates in the employment-law field, including those regarding
workers’
privacy,
out-of-work
political
speech,
and
whistleblowing, as well as the role of arbitration in resolving
employment disputes and, finally, the coverage of maximum-hour
legislation. As I hope to show, employment law pervasively
implicates questions of social equality. I end with a brief
conclusion.
I. A SOCIAL EQUALITY THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
In an article published a decade ago, I argued that
employment discrimination law is justified because it prohibits
employers from contributing to entrenched social inequalities.20 I
contended that the goal of antidiscrimination law, rather than
Cf. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169
(2011) (describing various conceptions of dignity in American law, of which
equality is only one).
19 Richard Michael Fischl, Labor Law, the Left, and the Lure of the Market, 94 MARQ.
L. REV. 947, 957-958 (2011).
20 See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 837-870.
18
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enforcing a rule of interpersonal ethics, was to eliminate a system
that entrenched subordination and occupational segregation—key
threats to social equality.21 Employer discrimination, of course, is a
central component of such a system. I argued that it was fair to
impose liability on a discriminating employer—at least where the
employer “can avoid contributing to the social harms of
subordination at a reasonable cost”—because such an employer is
at fault: “[H]e would rather retain some personal benefit (be it the
satisfaction of a taste for discrimination, or the realization of
dollars-and-cents profits) than avoid contributing to a
subordinating system.”22 I argued that this justification provided
support not only for prohibitions on animus-based discrimination
but also for prohibitions on “rational” intentional discrimination—
and even for requirements of reasonable accommodation.23
In this part, I argue that a roughly parallel argument can be
made to justify—and elaborate and evaluate the rules of—
individual employment law. I contend that we should understand
the goal of individual employment law, like the goal of
employment discrimination law, as promoting social equality. But
the threats to social equality are different outside of the
discrimination context. Where employment discrimination law
targets the threats to social equality caused by occupational
segregation
and
group-based
subordination,
individual
employment law should be understood as targeting the threat to
social equality posed by a boss’s ability to leverage her economic
power over workers into a more general social hierarchy in and out
of the workplace. As I show in Part II below, employers have
numerous opportunities to exploit this sort of leverage. Many of
the key debates in employment law—both the enduring debates
and those that are especially “hot” today—can be well understood
as focusing on this social equality concern. Just as in the
employment discrimination context, the employer is in the best
position to avert these threats to social equality, for it is the
employer’s acts that construct and entrench a system of social
hierarchy. And as with employment discrimination law, individual
employment law, properly construed, imposes only a reasonable
burden on employers to counteract these threats.
In the remainder of this part, I flesh out that argument.
Section A offers a general description and defense of the concept of
See id. at 839-844.
See id. at 858.
23 See id., passim.
21
22
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social equality as it has been articulated by legal and political
theorists. Section B draws out what social equality demands of
legal and social institutions, with a particular focus on how those
demands play out beyond the context of group-based stigma and
subordination that has been the major focus of social equality
advocates in the legal academy. Finally, Section C discusses the
limits on what social equality can legitimately demand of
employers.
A. A Description and Defense of Social Equality
At its most fundamental level, social equality is the idea
that—regardless of the various material inequalities that are
pervasive and may be inevitable—each of us deserves to be treated
as an equal member of our community.24 We each are thus equally
entitled to participate fully in the public life (political and civic) of
our democratic republic. We are entitled to be “free from
domination.”25 And we each are entitled to equal “deference or
regard”26 in our everyday relations with others in the community.
As Professor Walzer puts it, “[t]his is the lively hope named by the
word equality: no more bowing and scraping, fawning and
toadying; no more fearful trembling; no more high-and-mightiness;
no more masters, no more slaves.”27 Professor Karst captures the
point by quoting the following (aspirational) line from Simone de
Beauvoir: “’[T]he rich American has no grandeur; the poor man no
[servility]; human relations in daily life are on a footing of
equality.’”28 Perhaps this form of social equality finds its ultimate
expression in George Orwell’s observations of Barcelona early in
the Spanish Civil War: “Waiters and shop-walkers looked you in
the face and treated you as an equal. Servile and even ceremonial
forms of speech had temporarily disappeared.”29 Borrowing from
Professor Walzer and philosopher Gerald Gaus, Professor Jason
Solomon refers to “a socially-equal society” as “a ‘society of
See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 9, at 277 (describing “[d]emocratic citizenship” as
a status in which “[t]here is one norm of proper regard for the entire population
of citizens” and in which the norms of respect depend not on social position but
on treating ourselves and others as “full and equal member[s]” or “active
participant[s]” in the community); Karst, supra note 9, at 5 (“The essence of equal
citizenship is the dignity of full membership in the society).
25 WALZER, supra note 9, at xiii.
26 Karst, supra note 9, at 6.
27 WALZER, supra note 9, at xiii.
28 Karst, supra note 24, at 11 (quoting SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, AMERICA DAY BY DAY
261 (1953)).
29 GEORGE ORWELL, HOMAGE TO CATALONIA 5 (1952).
24
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misters,” where . . . everyone from the gardener to the CEO is
addressed as ‘mister’”—in other words, a society marked by “’the
absence of any natural ranking of individuals into those who
command and those who obey.’”30
Why should the law serve this conception of equality? A
variety of theoretical perspectives might lead one to find social
equality attractive. From a Kantian liberal perspective, one might
start from the premise that each individual is of “equal moral
worth”31 and deserves “equal concern and respect.”32 As Professor
Fourie argues, “[a] rather straightforward interpretation of equal
moral worth would be likely to consider it incompatible with
treating people as inferior or superior.” 33 One might get to the
same place from a communitarian perspective. The argument
would run that all members of our community deserve equal
respect, not by virtue of anything intrinsic to the moral worth of
persons, but instead because of their membership in the
community.34 One might also get there by way of the American
Republican tradition, which opposed domination, subordination,
and hierarchy, and which found expression—among other places—
in the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment.35
In legal and philosophical writing, the conception of social
equality is typically deployed as an argument against practices that
impose group-based harm. This group-based understanding of
social equality underlies many commentators’ defenses (including
my own) of antidiscrimination law. 36 Professor Karst argues that
“even in these applications, the main energies released by the equal
Solomon, supra note 9, at 254 (quoting WALZER, supra note 9, at 252; and
GERALD GAUS, POLITICAL CONCEPTS AND POLITICAL THEORIES 143 (2000)).
31 E.g., Anderson, supra note 9, at 312; Fourie, supra note 9, at 118.
32 E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY 6 (2000); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198-199, 273
(1977); DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 6 (2008).
33 Fourie, supra note 9, at 118.
34 Professor Walzer’s arguments tend in this direction, see WALZER, supra note 9,
at 276-277, as do Professor Sandel’s related arguments against certain sorts of
commodification. See, for example, Chapter 1 of MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT
MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012), which I think is best
understood as making a communitarian argument that the queue is often a fairer
means of distribution than the market.
35 See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1459 (2012).
36 See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY
(1996); Karst, supra note 9. I cite other examples in Bagenstos, supra note 8, at
839-844.
30
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citizenship principle are individualistic.” 37 Whether or not one
agrees with that assessment, it should be evident that the idea of
equal citizenship or social equality has substantial applications
even outside of the context of group-based discrimination.
Practices that entrench hierarchies based on socio-economic class,
for example, clearly raise social equality concerns,38 as do practices
that create other social-status hierarchies.39 In Part II, I argue that
many employment practices—even those that draw no groupbased distinctions—raise social equality concerns of the latter sort.
To be sure, one can imagine objections—from both
directions—to a focus on social equality. On the one hand, one
might argue that social equality does not go far enough as a theory
of equality. Any fully satisfying conception of equality, one might
argue, must focus on distribution of material goods.40 And, indeed,
in American political discourse, the supporters of social equality
have included neoliberals who have used the conception to argue
against redistributive welfare policy.41
There is much to this point, though political and legal
philosophers have gone around and around in debating which of
these theories of equality deserves our allegiance. Scholars such as
Professors Elizabeth Anderson and Carina Fourie have argued that
what I call social equality is in fact the most attractive specifically
egalitarian conception of equality. 42 Moreover, Professor David
Miller and others have narrowed the practical gap between social
and distributive equality theories by emphasizing the degree to
which a more equal distribution is necessary to secure social
equality.43 But these arguments are not essential to my position. I
Karst, supra note 24, at 8. In a recent article, Professor Karst brings the point
full circle by arguing that protecting fundamental individual liberties can
advance the equal-citizenship status of members of disadvantaged and
stigmatized groups. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups
and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99 (2007).
38 See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 9.
39 See Miller, supra note 9, at 232.
40 For an argument against distributive equality as the theory underlying
employment discrimination law, see Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 840-841.
41 E.g., MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY (1992).
42 See Anderson, supra note 9, at 312-313; Fourie, supra note 9, at 108.
43 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 235 (“If we want our society to be egalitarian,
then we will try to shape our distributive practices so that the emergence of
hierarchy is discouraged; in particular we will try to avoid the emergence of
large-scale, cumulative inequalities of advantage which make it difficult for
people to live together on terms of equality, even if politically they are all defined
as equals.”).
37
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do not argue that social equality is the only or even the most
attractive conception of equality, only that it is the one that is most
relevant to understanding, elaborating, and critiquing the body of
individual employment law. For that purpose, it is enough that
social equality represents at least one attractive conception of
equality, and that it is a conception that employment law is well
positioned to serve.
As I argue in Part II, the law governing individual
employment relationships is in fact especially well positioned to
serve the goal of social equality—even if current rules do not
always live up to their potential. And while aspects of individual
employment law (notably the minimum wage) may also serve
more distributive egalitarian goals, much of that body of law is
irrelevant to—or even in tension with—those goals. 44 Social
equality may in fact be the theory that holds the greatest capacity to
explain and justify the overall sweep of individual employment
law.
From the other direction, one might argue that social
equality—however justifiable as a guide to individual ethics or
morality—is not something the state can or should mandate. Such
a conception of equality, one might argue, smacks of mind control
and the inappropriate imposition of politically correct views on the
populace.45 To be sure, some theorists of social equality—notably
Professor Andy Koppelman—argue that the law should engage in a
thoroughgoing “project of cultural transformation” that aims to
eliminate (without necessarily directly suppressing) those attitudes
that sustain social inequality. 46 Such a project does have
disturbingly illiberal overtones. But one need not understand the
social equality project as being quite so ambitious. A legal regime
can seek to advance social equality by focusing on conduct rather
than attitudes—by eliminating the practices and economic levers
that empower individuals consequentially to treat others as
hierarchical subordinates. As I argue in Part II, this is a conception
of social equality that fits individual employment law well.
B. What Does Social Equality Demand?

For an attempt to justify the minimum wage not as aiming at material
redistribution so much as at social equality, see Zatz, supra note 14.
45 Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., You Say You Want a Revolution? The Case Against the
Transformation of Culture Through Antidiscrimination Laws, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1588
(1997).
46 KOPPELMAN, supra note 36, at 2.
44
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I should be a bit more specific about what the conception of
social equality demands.
Most centrally, it demands what
Professor Walzer calls “complex equality.” 47 It demands that
inequalities in economic position (which may be beneficial or
inevitable) not be automatically replicated into inequalities in other
areas of life that are key to participation in society. Professor David
Miller puts the point this way:
[Social equality] does not require that people should be
equal in power, prestige or wealth, nor, absurdly, that they
should score the same on natural dimensions such as
strength or intelligence. What matters is how such
differences are regarded, and in particular whether they
serve to construct a social hierarchy in which A can
unequivocally be ranked as B’s superior. Where there is
social equality, people feel that each member of the
community enjoys an equal standing with all the rest that
overrides their unequal ratings along particular
dimensions.48
In this respect, arguments about what social equality requires
overlap with arguments made by those theorists who are skeptical
of certain forms of commodification. Professor Debra Satz, for
example, argues that commodification of a human activity is
problematic if it leads to “outcomes that undermine the conditions
for citizens to interact as equals.”49 Professors Elizabeth Anderson
and Peggy Radin, too, have expressed concern with the way
commodification of certain activities (notably sex and parenthood)
can undermine social equality.50
Theorists of social equality have identified certain areas of
life in which financial inequalities should not be allowed to
replicate themselves (in other words, in which commodification
should be limited or barred). One involves activities of democratic
participation and access to the government. As Professor Anderson
E.g., WALZER, supra note 9, at 3-30.
Miller, supra note 9, at 232.
49 See, for example, Chapter 4 of DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE
FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2010).
50 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 154, 168-189
(1993); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 131-153 (1996). Note
that both Professor Anderson and Professor Radin frame their arguments in
terms of commodification undermining the intrinsic value of the activity. In this
sense their arguments resemble those of Professor Michael Sandel. See SANDEL,
supra note 34. But for Professors Anderson and Radin, at least, the socialequality concerns lie fairly close to the surface of their arguments.
47
48
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argues, equals are “free to participate in politics and the major
institutions of civil society,” so the equal ability “to participate in
democratic self-government” is a key part of “liv[ing] in an
egalitarian community.” 51 Along those lines, Professor Walzer
identifies the following as among the social goods that
presumptively may not be commodified: political power and
influence; basic political freedoms, obligations, and offices; and
basic governmental services.52 Social equality is threatened when
inequalities of wealth, income, or position are leveraged into
inequalities of access to the political process, community selfgovernment, the process of petitioning for redress of grievances,
and the protections of the law. 53 In this regard, as Professor
Solomon has emphasized, the opportunity to call someone to
account before a neutral tribunal for violation of one’s rights is a
central element of being a full and equal member of our society.54
But social equality matters outside of the context of
democratic and civic participation as well. In particular, where
inequalities of wealth, income, or position translate into hierarchies
of status—in which “one person is treated as a superior and
another as an inferior” in some general sense—social equality is
threatened. 55 To some extent, the concern here is one of
domination and subordination. As Professor Anderson argues,
“[e]quals are not dominated by others; they do not live at the mercy
of others’ wills.” 56 This anti-domination concern also finds
expression in the American Republican tradition that informed the
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment. 57 One problem with
domination is that a subordinate individual in such a relationship
Anderson, supra note 9, at 315.
WALZER, supra note 9, at 100-103; see also Don Herzog, How to Think About
Equality, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1633 (2002) (arguing that political power should
not be commodified).
53 See DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE, supra note 32, at 366 (arguing that “[c]itizen
equality” requires “that different groups of citizens not be disadvantaged, in
their effort to gain attention and respect for their views, by a circumstance so
remote from the substance of opinion or argument, or from the legitimate
sources of influence, as wealth is”).
54 See Solomon, supra note 9, at 252-253. It is hardly surprising that in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, our Nation’s first Reconstruction-Era civil rights statute, the
right “to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons or property” receives explicit
protection against discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
55 Fourie, supra note 9, at 111.
56 Anderson, supra note 9, at 315.
57 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 35.
51
52
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must often submit to humiliating and degrading rituals—such as
literally or figuratively engaging in the sort of “[b]owing and
scraping” that Kant argued was “unworthy of a human being.”58
We might legitimately fear that such domination is afoot
when one person, because of his or her wealth, can induce another
person with less wealth to give up the sorts of activities or
commitments that Professor Radin labels as “integral to the self” or
especially bound up with “personhood.”59 Even independent of
domination, we might be especially concerned that social equality
is threatened when one class of people—defined by wealth or
income—systematically gives up the choice to engage in those
activities that are especially important to defining and
understanding the self.60
One particular threat to social equality is the phenomenon of
asymmetric vulnerability. Where one individual is especially
vulnerable to the exercise of another’s economic power, and the
vulnerability is not reciprocated, it will be easier for the less
vulnerable person to establish a relationship of domination over the
more vulnerable one. Asymmetric vulnerability is a particular
concern in employment markets—especially in times of high
unemployment. For an individual worker, having and keeping a
job is supremely important. For the employer, by contrast,
individual employees are often replaceable or even fungible. For
the worker, the loss of a job can lead to the loss of the means of
making a living and of obtaining respect from self and
community.61 Where jobs are scarce, a worker might be willing to
subordinate herself in all sorts of ways to ensure that she doesn’t

58 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 188 (Mary Gregor, ed. 1996)
(originally published 1797). For an effort to draw a connection between
employment law and Kant’s argument on this point, see Matthew W. Finkin,
Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee as a Person in Western Law, 23 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 607 (2002).
59 RADIN, supra note 50, at 56.
60 There is, of course, a real question of paternalism here, which I discuss in the
next section.
61 See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405-1406, 14131415 (1967) (discussing harm to workers of losing a job); Marion Crain, Arm’sLength Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 163, 165-166
(2011) (same). On the importance of work to workers’ equal-citizenship status,
see Forbath, supra note 9, at 16-17; Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in
Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (1997).
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lose hers. 62 As I show in Part II, the employment relation is
therefore a central arena in the battle for social equality.
C. The Limitations of the Principle
To end all social inequality is a goal that is beyond the reach
of employment law—and likely of law itself. Even if law could
achieve that goal, a thoroughgoing effort to use law to eliminate
social inequality root and branch would likely require such
intrusive interventions as to violate other basic principles of our
liberal state. 63 But my argument is not that the law should
eliminate all sources of social inequality. It is far more modest. I
contend that employment practices are particularly likely to
implicate issues of social equality and that, when they do so, the
law should presumptively regulate those practices to remove the
most significant threats to that goal. Social equality is not an
absolute goal that the law should pursue though the heavens may
fall. Legal rules must take account of the extent and incidence of
costs they impose, as well as of other values that should limit their
application.64
Most obviously, employment law rules should not generally
prevent employers from engaging in remunerative business. The
goal of employment law, as I see it, is not to prevent employers
from engaging in managerial or entrepreneurial decisionmaking.
Rather, it is to regulate those aspects of employer prerogative that
impose significant threats to social equality without sufficient
countervailing benefits to society. Managers and owners are
typically in the best position to determine what workplace
arrangements maximize profitability. And, in general, an increase
in profits leads to an increase in the pool of material goods
available to the workers in the enterprise and to growth in the
economy (which itself benefits workers).65 The degree to which

Cf. Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 1161, 1220-1222 (2008) (arguing that, for many Latino immigrants, the
need to keep a job in the United States makes them “reluctant to turn down jobs
or to complain about work conditions,” while many African-Americans working
in low-wage jobs “seek to exercise some control over the terms and pace of the
work in which they engage” so that they may “ensure a modicum of dignity and
respect”).
63 See Hills, supra note 45.
64 See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 921.
65 Of course, the share that workers can obtain depends on the bargaining power
of the parties—which itself depends on legal rules such as support for collective
bargaining—as well as on the political feasibility of other redistributive policies
62
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employment-law rules advance social equality must necessarily be
weighed against the degree to which those rules limit profitability
and economic growth.
Some employer actions may be gratuitously abusive. An
example from employment discrimination law may be sexual
harassment. The analog in the case of individual employment law
might be a particularly intrusive invasion of a worker’s privacy.
Actions like these threaten social equality without enhancing the
bottom line of the enterprise. We can force employers to abandon
these sorts of practices without imposing any monetary cost.
Indeed, if doing so makes it easier to attract and retain skilled
workers, an employer might actually realize a monetary benefit by
abandoning abusive practices. 66 To be sure, the supervisor will
have to bear the cost of foregoing the utility that she presumably
obtains from engaging in abusive conduct. But we can properly
ignore that utility loss as stemming from illegitimate preferences.67
Even where it imposes some monetary cost, interference
with employer prerogatives in the service of social equality is still
justified. As Professor Matt Finkin notes, employment-law rules
that impose costs on employers to serve societal interests are
ubiquitous.68 The argument supporting these rules again parallels
the argument for prohibiting rational discrimination.
Social
inequality is an important social harm, and the employer is in the
best position to avoid entrenching and reinforcing that harm. An
employer that puts the interest in obtaining the absolute maximum
profit ahead of its obligation to avoid contributing to that social
harm is acting in a morally objectionable manner—one for which it
is fair to hold the employer accountable.

by government. There is an important role for redistributive policies, but they
largely lie outside of individual employment law.
66 One might question whether it is necessary for the law to step in to force
employers to do something that benefits them. In a perfectly competitive market
employers who engage in abusive practices that make it difficult to attract skilled
workers will be driven out of business. But markets are not perfectly
competitive, and they can take a long time to drive out abusive and inefficient
practices. Cf. John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411
(1986) (arguing that, even if the market would eventually drive discriminating
employers out of business, Title VII accelerates our arrival at that efficient longrun equilibrium).
67 This is an application of the notion of “laundering” preferences; the discussion
in text glosses over the complications of this notion. See Bagenstos, supra note 8,
at 881-883.
68 See Matthew W. Finkin, Life Away From Work, 66 LA. L. REV. 945 (2006).
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Employment discrimination law uses two principal
techniques to determine when it is too costly to impose on
employers an obligation to avoid contributing to inequality. The
first is domain restriction. Thus, the law does not permit
employers any defense for intentional race discrimination against
minorities—even if the discrimination is bottom-line rational. 69
That rule may be explained at least in part as reflecting the
conclusion that forbearing from racial discrimination is rarely likely
to impose heavy costs on a particular employer—especially if all
other employers are required to forbear as well. Particularly where
it is the preferences of biased customers or coworkers that make
discrimination rational for an employer, we are willing to impose
on employers a short-term cost of increased friction in the
workplace to achieve a long-term equilibrium in which those
preferences go away (or at least may not be consequential in any
workplace).
For sex discrimination, by contrast, rational discrimination is
permissible if it is a “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ)
for the position in question.70 This rule reflects, in part, a judgment
that forgoing sex discrimination will sometimes impose intolerable
costs on employers, at least in two sorts of cases: (1) cases in which
an entire line of business is necessarily and not merely contingently
built on sex differences (a line that cannot be drawn without
making normative judgments); or (2) cases in which customer
preferences to be served by a member of a particular sex rest on
concerns about gender privacy that our society is still willing to
endorse.71
The second technique employment discrimination law
employs is straightforward balancing. Thus, in cases in which an
individual’s disability is incompatible with the way a job is
currently structured, courts will ask whether there is any
“reasonable accommodation” that will enable the individual to
perform “essential functions” of the job without imposing “undue
hardship” on the employer.72 In the case of employment practices
See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 851-852 (discussing Title VII’s prohibition of
even rational intentional discrimination); Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Casteing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40
(2007) (“On its face, Title VII provides no BFOQ defense for race.”).
70 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
71 For a good discussion of the cases in this area, see Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private
Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 147 (2004).
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
69
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that are alleged to violate Title VII or the ADA because they have a
disparate impact, the law asks whether the practice is “job-related”
and “consistent with business necessity.”73
Unlike in the context of intentional race and sex
discrimination, the law of reasonable accommodation and
disparate impact asks courts to engage in a more overt balancing of
interests. But in all of these areas, the law filters the consideration
of costs through its definition of the job at issue. Crucially, the law
requires courts (with more or less deference to the employer’s
views) to make their own independent determinations of what the
job consists of. 74 Because of the interest in avoiding social
inequality, the law takes away a bit of the employer’s managerial
prerogative to define the nature of the job. And the law takes away
that prerogative even when doing so will impose costs on
employers.
As I will show in Part II, these techniques have lessons for
individual employment law. Employment law can sometimes limit
the costs it imposes on employers through domain restriction. For
example, I argue below that—except where certain categories of
employees are concerned—employers should be categorically
barred from regulating the off-the-job speech or conduct of their
workers. Such a rule will doubtless impose costs on employers
who have legitimate bottom-line-oriented reasons for concern
about their employees’ off-the-job conduct. But the costs to the
employers are likely to be much less—and the benefits for social
equality much greater—when an employer is barred from
regulating off-the-job conduct than when it is barred from
regulating on-the-job conduct.
Other times, individual
employment law will do best by weighing employer costs directly
in each case. An example here might be the law involving
employee privacy within the workplace.
As in the employment discrimination context, the definition
of the employee’s job will be a crucial fulcrum of evaluation. And
just as in the employment discrimination context, an employer
cannot be permitted absolute prerogative to define the job—even
when it has financial interests in doing so. A coal company may
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), 12112(b)(6).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (providing that “consideration shall be given to the
employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential
functions of the job”) (emphasis added).

73
74
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have an interest in ensuring that its employees contribute to
Republicans, if Republicans are likely to support a regulatory
environment that aids the company’s bottom line. But to allow the
company to define a miner’s job as extracting coal from the ground
plus writing checks to Republican candidates would allow the
company to leverage its economic power over employees into
additional political power—a direct threat to social equality. Just as
in the employment discrimination setting, the law should provide a
check on the employer’s definition of job tasks.
Individual employment law does seem—at least at first
glance—to implicate at least one concern that lacks a parallel in
employment discrimination law.
That is a concern about
paternalism. Employment law imposes terms on the employment
relationship that the parties would otherwise be legally free to
adopt themselves if they so chose. Orthodox economic theory
would tell us that when employees do not insist on including a
given term, that indicates that they value that term less than
whatever they were getting in exchange for it. To require
employers to provide that term in such circumstances—at least
where the employer is free to take away something else in
exchange for including the mandatory term—will therefore make
the employee worse off—according to her own preferences—than
she would be in the absence of the mandate.75
There are all sorts of reasons, even from within economic
theory, to believe that this orthodox account fails in a wide range of
cases to accurately describe the effects of employment law
mandates.76 But that account clearly offers an accurate description
75 For arguments to this effect, see Epstein, supra note 4; Morriss, supra note 4.
Law-and-economics types are not the only ones concerned about this problem.
This concern with the possibly perverse effects of banning problematic
commodification is a central aspect of Professor Radin’s writing, see RADIN, supra
note 50, at 123-130, and the writing of other feminist scholars, see Joan C.
Williams & Viviana A. Zelizer, To Commodify or Not to Commodify: That is Not the
Question, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND
CULTURE 362 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, eds., 2005).
76 Professor Willborn offers a number of reasons, from within economic theory,
why mandatory terms might make workers better off. See Steven L. Willborn,
Individual Employment Rights and the Standard Economic Objection: Theory and
Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101 (1988). For arguments focused on employees’
lack of full information, see sources cited infra note 90. For arguments, rooted in
economic theory, that the effects of mandatory employment terms will depend
on the respective value of those terms to employers and employees, and on the
heterogeneity of employees’ preferences, see Christine Jolls, Accommodation
Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223 (2000); Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple
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at least some of the time. A social equality approach helps to show
why that is nonetheless not a decisive argument against imposing
mandatory terms through employment law. The imposition of
mandatory employment terms may force some workers to accept
deals that do not optimally satisfy their preferences, but a social
equality model posits that the goal of employment law is not the
satisfaction of individual employees’ preferences. Rather, the goal
is a systemic one—to prevent and eliminate significant threats to
social equality. In this respect, again, individual employment law
is analogous to employment discrimination law. Even if some
employees would be better off without antidiscrimination
protections, that cost is nonetheless justified because the body of
law disentrenches segregation and subordination.
None of this is to say that the costs imposed on individual
workers are irrelevant to an assessment of employment law rules,
even under a social equality theory. If those rules significantly
increase unemployment, for example, there would be a strong basis
to argue against such rules—not least because increased
unemployment itself undermines social equality.77 And where, as
Professor Julie Suk shows regarding France’s highly rigid
employment-law system, the disemployment effects fall especially
heavily on already stigmatized and segregated social groups, social
equality provides a doubly strong basis to criticize them. 78
Whether any of the particular rules I discuss in Part II will lead to
such effects requires serious empirical analysis. But each of those
rules seems quite far from imposing the sorts of dislocations that
the French system has—and those rules can be designed to
minimize the risk of that result.
II. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS
In this Part, I sketch some possible doctrinal applications of a
social equality theory of individual employment law. As I hope to
show, a social-equality focus has implications for a wide array of
employment-law rules. In some doctrinal areas, such a focus
suggests quite significant changes in current rules; in others, it
suggests milder tweaks or extensions; and in still others it suggests
that current rules have it about right. But my goal in this Part is not
to make a comprehensive case for any particular reform or defense
Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 177
(1989).
77 On the importance of work to social equality, see sources cited supra note 61.
78 See Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal
Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73 (2007).
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of any particular rule. Any such case must engage in depth with
the specific considerations at play in a particular rule choice.
Although I offer some suggestions in that direction, my goal in this
part is narrower: first, to show how employment law rules
pervasively implicate questions of social equality; and second, to
suggest that a focus on those questions can enrich our analysis—
and sharpen our critiques and defenses—of those rules.
In Section A, I argue that a social equality approach supports
longstanding critiques of the employment-at-will rule. That rule is
the most debated principle of employment law, and I cannot hope
(and do not attempt) to resolve the debate. Rather, I attempt to
show that classic challenges to employment-at-will rest on an
inchoate version of the social equality approach I articulate in this
paper. The debate over the rule thus provides an apt first
illustration of my argument. In Section B, I argue that social
equality also demands legal rules that generally respect worker
privacy—and I show how a social equality approach helps us
elaborate those rules.
In Section C, I argue that a social equality approach suggests
that the law should limit private employers’ ability to regulate the
political speech of their employees. I discuss this question more
extensively than I do the other doctrinal areas in this part, because
regulation of workers’ political speech is currently an important
area of discussion in employment law and because considering that
area highlights the ways in which a social equality approach can
accommodate employer interests.
Section D extends this
discussion to anti-retaliation and whistleblower protection statutes.
Section E discusses the (ambiguous) implications of a social
equality approach for the rise of mandatory employment
arbitration. And Section F shows how social equality ideas
underlie limitations on child labor as well as maximum-hours laws.
For many of the doctrines I discuss, hints of social equality
arguments appear in the scholarly, judicial, and political discourse.
For others, social equality may appear to be more of a novel
justification. In all events, I contend that social equality is a useful
concept in understanding and critiquing individual employment
law.
A. The Employment-at-Will Rule
A core aspect of social equality is what de Beauvoir
described as “’human relations in daily life [being] on a footing of
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equality.’” 79 Precisely because work is central to most people’s
day-to-day lives, the legal rules governing the employment
relationship can have a significant effect on the equality or
inequality of these social relations. In particular, given the
disproportionate power owners and supervisors often have over
their workers, the workplace continually threatens to create and
entrench hierarchies of status. Employment law can help to
undermine these hierarchies. But too often it fails to meet this
potential, and it bolsters those hierarchies instead. The strong
default rule of employment at will is a prime example.
The most significant source of workplace hierarchy is the
boss’s power to fire. Under the baseline employment-at-will rule
that continues to prevail in all American jurisdictions but
Montana, 80 an employer can terminate an employee for a good
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all—unless the employer’s
reason is specifically forbidden by some external source of law such
as an antidiscrimination statute. And even when the employer
does act for a forbidden reason, the at-will rule will make it difficult
as a practical matter for the employee to prove it, because that rule
facilitates employers’ assertion of pretextual reasons for
termination. 81 Although the rights of the employer and the
employee to terminate the relationship at will are formally
symmetrical, a worker often needs a particular job more than the
employer needs a particular worker. This is especially true in times
of high unemployment.
The at-will rule therefore gives bosses ample power to
require employees to engage in the “bowing and scraping, fawning
and toadying”82 that is the bête noire of social equality. Professors
Chris Bertram, Corey Robin, and Alex Gourevitch argue that the atwill rule makes it “difficult to conceive of a less free institution for
adults than the average workplace,” where “[o]n pain of being
fired,” workers “can be commanded to pee or forbidden to pee”;
can be “forbidden to wear what they want, say what they want
(and at what decibel), and associate with whom they want”; and
See Karst, supra note 9, at 11 (quoting DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 28, at 261)
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 et seq.; Arnow-Richman, supra note 4, at 4 n.9
(stating that “employment at will is the established law in every state except
Montana, which has modified the default rule by statute”).
81 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1655 (1995); Joseph E. Slater, The “American Rule” That Swallows the
Exceptions, 11 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53 (2007).
82 WALZER, supra note 9, at xiii.
79
80
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“can be fired for donating a kidney to their boss (fired by the same
boss, that is), refusing to have their person or effects searched,
calling the boss a ‘cheapskate’ in a personal letter, and more.”83 As
Professor Bagchi contends, practices like these demonstrate—and
enact—social status hierarchies within the workplace.84
These sorts of practices seem abusive and arbitrary in many
cases. Arguments against employment at will often focus on this
sort of employer abuse or arbitrariness and on the “morally
reprehensible employer motives” that may underlie it.85 But just as
I have argued in the employment discrimination context, motive or
malice ought not to be the crucial factor in determining whether the
law should regulate an employer’s conduct. The problem is not
simply that individual employees will have no remedy for the
abusive acts of their bosses. Rather, a social equality perspective
suggests that the problem rests in the entire system of social
relations that the at-will rule engenders.
Some of the classic critiques of employment-at-will focus on
these sorts of systemic effects. They thus rest on at least an
inchoate version of a social equality approach. Dean Lawrence
Blades, for example, captured the crucial point in his critique.
Because employment-at-will effectively “forces the non-union
employee to rely on the whim of his employer for preservation of
his livelihood,” Blades argued, it “tends to make him a docile
follower of his employer’s every wish.”86 A worker who knows she
can be terminated for virtually any reason will submit to any
number of degradations, and supervisors will be tempted to force
her to do so. The result is to entrench a hierarchy within the
workplace, in which a boss’s dominion over the worker goes
beyond what simply serves the productive mission of the
workplace and potentially extends to any aspect of the worker’s
life. As Professor Clyde Summers argued, the social relations
engendered by the at-will rule reflect a “deeply rooted conception
of the employment relation as a dominant-servient relation”—in
Chris Bertram, Corey Robin & Alex Gourevitch, Let it Bleed: Libertarianism and
the Workplace, http://crookedtimber.org/2012/07/01/let-it-bleed-libertarianismand-the-workplace/ (July 1, 2012).
84 See Bagchi, supra note 16, at 591.
85 Arnow-Richman, supra note 4, at 10 (arguing that many advocates of just-cause
protections have “presented at-will employment as enabling arbitrary, malicious,
and even socially harmful employer behavior,” and that the opposition to
employment-at-will has been based on “the condemnation of morally
reprehensible employer motives”).
86 Blades, supra note 61, at 1405.
83
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which “[t]he employer is sovereign over his or her employee
subjects”—“rather than one of mutual rights and obligations.”87 A
relationship in which one party is so subject to the whims of the
other is not a relationship of equality and mutual respect.88
Defenders of employment-at-will make two basic arguments
against abandonment of the rule. First, they argue that, because it
is merely a default rule, employers and employees are free to
contract around it. If employees have not sought just-cause
protection in their employment contracts, these defenders contend,
that indicates that employees value those protections less than they
value whatever they receive from employers in exchange for giving
them up. 89 This argument is substantially undermined by the
findings that workers often assume that they cannot be discharged
arbitrarily, even when the law in fact provides them no such
protection.90
The second argument in defense of employment-at-will
involves employer cost. A just-cause regime, defenders of the atwill relationship argue, imposes significant costs on employers by
making it too difficult to discipline shirking employees—and
entangling them in costly litigation when they attempt to do so.91
As I argued in Part I.C., this is an entirely appropriate matter to
consider in framing employment-law rules. Yet key proposals to
replace employment-at-will already take account of this
consideration. As I suggested in Part I.C., one way they do this is
Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 78 (2000).
88 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779, 791 (1994) (suggesting that critics of the employment-at-will rule invoke
“notions of equality” (or “civic equality and respect”) when they “claim that the
rule reflects an inadequate kind of valuation of workers because it subjects them
to the whim of employers”).
89 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 953-956; J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical
Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate,
1995 WIS. L. REV. 837.
90 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 118-121 (1999);
Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It
Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6 (2002); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining With Imperfect
Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 105 (1997); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring
the Influences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447; Jesse Rudy,
What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-at-Will in Light of
Findings That Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 317-338 (2002).
91 See Epstein, supra note 4, at 964-966; Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice:
Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993).
87
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by giving employers significant leeway in determining what sort of
performance the worker’s job requires. The Model Employment
Termination Act, for example, defines the “good cause” necessary
for termination in a manner that is quite deferential to employers’
interests in defining what is necessary job performance.92 It would
not even apply this good-cause requirement until an employee has
worked for an employer for at least a year; during the one-year
probationary period, the at-will rule would continue to prevail.93
And it provides that the good-cause standard would be enforced in
relatively streamlined arbitration proceedings.94
The Model Employment Termination Act has drawn
criticism from both the employer and the employee perspective.95
There is no need, for present purposes, to endorse or reject the
precise compromise it draws. The crucial points are these: First,
the longstanding challenges to employment-at-will draw support
from (and at times have rested on arguments indistinguishable
from) the social equality approach I defend in this paper. Second,
as my argument demands, legislation overturning employment-atwill can strike at the doctrine’s most significant threats to social
equality without imposing undue costs on particular employers.
B. Worker Privacy
The at-will rule does not just enable individual bosses or
supervisors to engage in arbitrary or abusive conduct. It also
enables employers to adopt policies that intrude on what are
generally understood to be the “private” lives of workers.96 The
concept of privacy is notoriously broad. As Professor Pauline Kim
notes, it “has been invoked to protect a variety of distinct interests
in the workplace,” including workers’ “bodily integrity,” their
interest in “avoiding intrusion on physical spaces,” their property
interest in their “personal items,” their interest in “preventing
disclosure of personal information,” and more general interests in
See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment Termination
Act, 69 WASH. L. REV. 361, 371-372 (1994).
93 See id. at 372.
94 See id. at 376-379; see also William B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in
Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 BYU L.
REV. 885, 908 (arguing that “[t]he first basic ingredient” in just-cause legislation
“should be arbitration, its virtues being speed, economy, and informality”).
95 See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A
Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 426-427 (2002).
96 See Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship,
57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 676 (1996) (arguing that “any meaningful protection of
employee privacy requires limitation of an employer’s power to fire at will.”).
92

25
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/62

26

Bagenstos:

“individual autonomy.”97 Under the privacy rubric, workers have
challenged employers’ regulation of out-of-work activity—like
dating, smoking, and volunteering at a worker’s chosen charity—as
well as employers’ at-work intrusions on their bodies, effects, or
personal spaces.98 Some of these challenges have been successful;
many have not.
These privacy claims are often understood as invoking a
purely individualistic interest in liberty, autonomy, or dignity. 99
But they also quite directly implicate social equality. Privacy
norms do more than protect individual liberty or autonomy. They
also mark a person’s status as a full member of the community. As
the philosopher Jeffrey Reiman argued nearly four decades ago,
“[p]rivacy is an essential part of the complex social practice by
means of which the group recognizes—and communicates to the
individual—that his existence is his own.” 100 To deny certain
persons or classes of persons the privacy normally accorded to
others is therefore to deny them “the respect normally accorded to
full-fledged members of the community.”101
That employee privacy cases implicate social equality thus
seems fairly clear. How a social equality perspective should alter
the resolution of those cases is less clear. Where there is a broad
social consensus supporting certain aspects of privacy, a boss who
denies a worker those aspects of privacy does seem to be asserting
“the
employer’s
higher
status
and
the
employee’s
102
Searches of one’s purse or one’s body, or
subordination.”
regulations of what workers do in their own homes or on their own
Pauline T. Kim, Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 901,
901 (2012).
98 For a general treatment of these issues, see MATTHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW (3d ed. 2009).
99 For a good recent example of this attitude, see Steven L. Willborn, Consenting
Employees, 66 LA. L. REV. 975 (2006).
100 Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 39
(1976).
101 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 968 (1989); see also Kim, supra note 96, at
692 (common-law privacy torts are concerned with those violations “which
threaten an individual’s identity by withdrawing the deference normally
afforded a member of the community”); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy,
89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092 (2001) (“To equate privacy with dignity is to ground
privacy in social forms of respect we owe each other as members of a common
community.”).
102 Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining
Appearance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (2006).
97
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time, seem to violate these common understandings of privacy.
Accordingly, a social equality approach can applaud the commonlaw analysis applied in many states—an analysis that focuses on
expectations of privacy and typically is skeptical of bodily
intrusions and searches of personal items.103 It can also applaud
the statues in many jurisdictions that prohibit employers from
taking adverse action on the basis of their employees’ lawful out-ofwork activities.104
But the conventionalist nature of this approach seems
problematic. 105 A conventionalist approach can rein in outlier
employers—those who are acting in a manner inconsistent with
what are then-widespread social norms—but it cannot protect
against changes in social norms generally. As ongoing changes to
the organization of work blur the boundaries between “work time”
and “non-work time,” and as employers are increasingly conscious
of the contribution of out-of-work activities to employees’ health
insurance costs, current norms may change. 106 Moreover, these
social norms may themselves be affected by what the law permits
or prohibits. Because statutory and common law permitted so
many employers to test their employees for drug use, for example,
that practice became sufficiently widespread in the 1980s and 1990s
that there is substantially less of a social norm against submission
to urinalysis than there was 30 years ago.107 On the flip side, public
attitudes toward cigarette smoking have rapidly evolved in such a
negative direction that it is plausible that employers’ prohibition of
employees’ out-of-work smoking could become equally
normalized—but for the widespread passage of statutes protecting
For a good recent summary, see Kim, supra note 97, at 905-908.
For a recent (critical) summary of these statutes, see M. Todd Henderson, The
Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1591-1595 (2009).
105 This, of course, is a longstanding problem with privacy law.
See Mark
Tushnet, Legal Conventionalism in the U.S. Constitutional Law of Privacy, 17 SOCIAL
PHIL. & POL’Y 141 (2000).
106 See Kim, supra note 97, at 908-914; Henderson, supra note 104, at 1528-1530;
James A. Sonne, Monitoring for Quality Assurance: Employer Regulation of Off-Duty
Behavior, 43 GA. L. REV. 133, 146-153 (2008). These norms were very much
contested in the negotiations surrounding the wellness provisions of the
Affordable Care Act, which ultimately gave employers more power than they
previously held to financially incentivize healthy conduct by their employees.
See JOHN E. MCDONOUGH, INSIDE NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 191-194 (2011).
107 For a good discussion of the expansion of workplace drug testing, and the
legal response to it, see Pauline T. Kim, Collective and Individual Approaches to
Protecting Employee Privacy: The Experience with Workplace Drug Testing, 66 LA. L.
REV. 1009 (2006).
103
104
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workers’ lawful off-duty conduct. Because social norms about
privacy are in part endogenous to law, those norms appear to
provide no independent basis for determining what the law should
permit or prohibit.
These points demonstrate that workplace privacy
protections cannot be purely conventionalist. A social equality
perspective cannot precisely answer the question of where to draw
the line of privacy protection, but it does suggest three points that
may help guide the search for answers. First, simply because an
employer may have a financial interest in regulating an employee’s
conduct outside of the workplace or working hours, that does not
imply that the law should permit the employer to define the job as
including compliance with regulations of such conduct. As I noted
above, employment discrimination law limits employers’ ability to
define their employees’ jobs in ways that threaten significant
equality interests—even if the employer would realize a financial
benefit by defining the job in such ways.108 Southwest Airlines may
profit by requiring its flight attendants to be female sex objects for a
predominantly male business-traveler clientele, but the law
prohibits it from doing so. 109 The threat to gender equality of
employers adopting such policies is too great, and the cost to the
airline of abandoning such a policy is sufficiently small, to justify a
prohibition.
An analogous point applies to off-work activities. The
opportunity to choose one’s own recreational and avocational
activities is a key part of what it means to be a full member of our
society. Those are often the activities in which individuals develop
their sense of personal identity and their ties with like-minded
people in the community. To allow an employer to use its
economic power over an employee to regulate those activities
threatens social equality. To be sure, an employer may experience
some increase in health-care costs if its employees engage in risky
activities. Or it may experience some reputational costs if its
employees engage in controversial activities.110 But the cost in the
See supra Part I.C.
See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(rejecting claim that “femininity, or more accurately female sex appeal,” is a
BFOQ for the job of flight attendant).
110 Consider the recent example of Michael Brutsch, who was fired from his job at
a financial services company after Gawker revealed that he was the individual,
known on the Reddit website as “Violentacrez,” who “posted pictures and
hosted discussions about dead teenage girls, rape, and anti-Semitism.” Meredith
Bennett-Smith, Reddit Troll Michael Brutsch Looks for Work in Porn, Tries to Put
108
109
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run of cases is unlikely to be so great as to justify the threat to social
equality posed by allowing employers to regulate worker conduct
outside of the workplace and outside of working hours. 111
Exceptions to this principle might exist in those categories of cases
in which the cost to the employer is likely to be especially large.
These categories might include very high-level employees whose
controversial actions are especially likely to be reasonably
attributed to the employer, 112 or individuals with truly unique
talents who could leave the employer in the lurch if they were
injured while engaging in especially risky activities.113
Second, certain privacy protections might be central to
protecting other aspects of social equality—such as access to
political and civic life. Professor Kim, for example, argues that
workers should be protected from employer surveillance of their
communications in order to ensure that they have the space to
develop and transmit ideas and information that are socially
valued—particularly ideas and information regarding their
employers’ violations of law. 114 A social equality perspective
suggests that employees should be entitled to some such degree of
protected space regardless of whether existing social norms
promote it.115
Finally, a social equality analysis can look to whether
different classes of workers are treated differently. If employers
subject line workers to intrusions on their persons, their effects, or
“Jailbait” Experience to Use, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 24, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/24/reddit-troll-michael-brutschlooking-for-work-in-porn_n_2009815.html.
111 See Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and Private Lives,
66 LA. L. REV. 1035 (2006) (arguing that employers should be sharply limited in
their ability to regulate worker conduct off the job).
112 Under such a rule, for example, the Cleveland Clinic could refuse to hire a
smoker as a medical director but would be barred from refusing to hire a smoker
to work on a loading dock. Cf. A.G. Sulzberger, Hospitals Shift Smoking Bans to
Smoker Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, at A1 (discussing Cleveland Clinic’s ban on
hiring smokers).
113 For example, a professional football team might prohibit its starting
quarterback from riding a motorcycle without a helmet. See Big Ben in Serious
Condition
After
Motorcycle
Accident,
ESPN.COM,
June
13,
2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2480830.
114 See Kim, supra note 97, at 925-931.
115 Of course, an employer must have a means of protecting itself against criminal
liability should an employee, for example, download child pornography on the
employer’s computer. But employers can serve that interest without intruding
on all of an employee’s private communications.
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their lives that go beyond the intrusions to which they subject
supervisors and managers, that disparity suggests that the
intrusions play a role in establishing or maintaining a hierarchy of
status. 116 Absent a strong business reason for drawing the
distinction—and, for the reasons I have discussed, business reasons
should if anything point to greater intrusions on high-level
employees—a social equality approach should look askance at such
intrusions.
Professor Todd Henderson is highly skeptical of laws that
limit employers’ ability to regulate their employees’ off-work
activities. He asserts that employers do not engage in such
regulation because of a desire to dominate their workers’ lives but
simply because employers bear some of the costs of out-of-work
choices.117 Where individuals do not bear the full costs of their
conduct, Henderson contends, efforts by others to regulate that
conduct will be “inevitable.” 118 The only question, he says, is
whether private employers will regulate more efficiently than will
the government.119 Because employers are disciplined by market
constraints (in both the labor and the financial markets) in a way
that the government is not, he posits that employers are often in the
best position to force workers efficiently to internalize the costs of
their activities.120
Professor Henderson does not persuasively undermine the
case for limiting employers’ ability to regulate off-work activities.
For one thing, his entire argument is based on the premise, largely
assumed but not proven, that market forces will ensure that such
regulations serve only the interest in “economics, not
domination.”121 But Henderson himself cites examples in which
116 Cf. Selmi, supra note 111, at 1051 (“Another way to obtain a reasonable balance
between the interests of employers and employees with respect to medical
screening would be to require employers to implement screening across-theboard, to top executives as well as those at the bottom. My sense is that many
employers would shy away from genetic testing or other health screenings if
they were also subject to the tests.”).
117 See Henderson, supra note 104, at 1519.
118 Id. at 1519.
119 See id. at 1552 (“[T]he only relevant question is: who is the most efficient
nanny?”).
120 See id. at 1553-1558, 1561-1564.
121 Id. at 1534. Professor Henderson also argues that the law will constrain the
most abusive exercises of employer power to regulate employees’ private lives—
an argument that seems to deprive him of any ground on which to stand in
opposing laws designed to limit employer regulations that the political process
deems abusive. See id. at 1558-1559.
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employers have sought to control aspects of workers’ home lives
that would seem to have only the most tenuous relationship to the
employer’s bottom line122—though he calls the employers’ conduct
in these cases “reasonabl[e]” 123 and “unobjectionable.” 124 Even
wellness programs, which Professor Henderson touts as
substantially reducing health costs by regulating employee
behavior,125 are unlikely to have the sorts of cost-reducing effects he
presumes they will.126 To the extent that the bottom-line benefits of
employer regulations of off-work conduct are overblown, social
equality concerns should be heightened. And the residual costs of
avoiding such regulations are appropriately placed on employers
as the cost of ensuring that their workers can be full members of
our society. This is particularly true where, as I have suggested it
should, the law provides a defense to those categories of employers
who will face unusually high costs if they cannot regulate their
employees’ off-work conduct.
Professor Henderson’s argument also rests on the unproven
suggestion that regulation of workers’ behavior is inevitable, and
that where employers cannot engage in that sort of regulation the
government will. 127 But if off-work activity imposes costs on
employers, there is no particular reason to believe that the
government will necessarily step in to regulate that activity if
employers cannot. Employers might well pressure the government
to adopt such regulations, but workers’ groups are likely to oppose
them—particularly if those groups have succeeded in obtaining
legislation denying employers the right to regulate that behavior
See id. at 1541 (describing how Henry Ford “deployed a team of 150 to
investigate the lifestyle of each Ford employee,” ensure that they were not
participating in activities “such as smoking, drinking, gambling, and
prostitution,” and “ offer employees advice on issues including childcare, money
management, alcohol abuse, personal hygiene, and house maintenance”); id. at
1543 n.90 (discussing employers’ recent efforts to incentivize employees to
“tak[e] classes on managing personal finances, learn[] about art, teach[] their
children not to watch television or play video games, and so on”); cf. Morriss,
supra note 4, at 1901 (quoting one of the founders of Ben & Jerry’s as saying: “If I
can fire someone for making shitty ice cream, then I can fire them for being a
shitty person.”).
123 Henderson, supra note 104, at 1540.
124 Id. at 1543 n.90.
125 See id. at 1546-1552.
126 See Al Lewis & Vik Khanna, Is it Time to Re-Examine Workplace Wellness “Get
Well
Quick”
Schemes?,
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG,
Jan.
16,
2013,
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/01/16/is-it-time-to-re-examine-workplacewellness-get-well-quick-schemes/.
127 See Henderson, supra note 104, at 1552.
122
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themselves. 128 And, as Professor Henderson himself argues, an
employer’s regulation of an individual’s private life is likely to be
much more effective than a government’s, because the employer
does not face the administrative, constitutional, and political
constraints on individual intrusions that a government does. 129
Professor Henderson’s argument thus does not fatally undermine
the case I have made in this section for limiting employers’ power
to regulate most workers’ off-work conduct.

Indeed, Professor Henderson recognizes that regulation of worker behavior
might be an instance of a collective action problem, in which market forces will
not operate to check employers’ intrusive regulations, even if those regulations
are inefficient because of the high costs they impose on workers. See id. at 1584.
If that is the case, a law denying employers the power to regulate off-work
conduct will not necessarily be followed by a law giving that power to the
government.
129 See id. at 1564, 1576.
128
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C. Workers’ Political Speech and Activities
1. The Social Equality Case for Constraining Employers’
Regulation of Employees’ Political Speech—Each election cycle, the
press offers numerous accounts of employers’ efforts to encourage
their employees to support or oppose particular candidates or
ballot propositions. Often, these efforts are backed by implicit or
even explicit threats to discriminate or retaliate against employees
who vote or engage in political speech on behalf of the “wrong”
side. The 2012 election was no exception. If anything, as the first
presidential election after the Supreme Court’s Citizens United
decision loosened restrictions on corporate political speech,130 the
2012 election seemed to mark a newly aggressive approach by
employers.131
Some of these employer efforts appeared simply to reflect an
aggressive effort by management to let employees know which
candidates’ election would, in their view, best serve the interests of
the company. For example, Wynn Resorts issued its employees a
67-page “Voter Guide” telling them which candidates the company
supported.132 But even there, some employees detected a coercive
overtone. In light of the voter guide and the company CEO’s “fiery
diatribes against [President] Obama during TV appearances and
corporate conference calls,” one Wynn employee told a reporter
that “’[i]f [she] had an Obama bumper sticker, [she’d] be scared for
[her] job,’” and that she was “worried what might happen to
employees who are caught backing non-Wynn-sponsored
candidates outside work, like with ‘a yard sign, a donation or a
blog [post].’” 133 Another employer, Georgia Pacific, issued a
similar voter guide, while enforcing a social media policy in a way
that employees perceived to target their private posting of political
articles on Facebook.134 And other employers combined appeals to
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
See Steven Greenhouse, Here’s a Memo from the Boss: Vote This Way, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 2012 at A1.
132 Nate C. Hindman & Christina Wilkie, Wynn Employee Voter Guide Pressures
Workers to Vote Right, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 26, 2012.
133 Id. In 2004, a company that makes home insulation fired an employee “for
driving to work with a Kerry-Edwards bumper sticker in the rear windshield of
her” car. Timothy Noah, Bumper Sticker Insubordination, SLATE, Sept. 14, 2004.
134 See Mike Elk, Koch Sends Pro-Romney Mailing to 45,000 Employees While Stifling
Workplace
Political
Speech,
IN
THESE
TIMES,
Oct.
14,
2012,
http://inthesetimes.org/article/14017/koch_industries_sends_45000_employees
_pro_romney_mailing (“When McKinney applied for a foreman job at the plant
in May, he says, his supervisor informed him that a higher-up said he wouldn’t
130
131
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their employees to vote for Governor Romney with predictions (or
perhaps threats) that President Obama’s reelection would lead
them to lay off workers.135 As Professors Bruce Ackerman and Ian
Ayres show, this sort of employer conduct is hardly new: “When
William Jennings Bryan squared off against William McKinley for
the presidency in 1896, the head of Steinway piano warned his
workers, ‘Men, vote as you please, but if Bryan is elected
tomorrow, the whistles will not blow Wednesday morning.’”136
In other companies, CEOs sent fundraising appeals for
Governor Romney’s campaign to all of their employees. 137
According to one press report, one of these companies, Murray
Energy, “ha[d] for years pressured salaried employees to give to
the [company’s] political action committee (PAC) and to
Republican candidates chosen by the company.”138 According to
that report, internal documents “show that company officials track
who is and is not giving,”139 and that the company’s CEO, Robert
Murray, took an intense personal interest in which employees gave
money.140 The report anonymously quoted two individuals who
had worked as managers at the company to the following effect:
“There’s a lot of coercion,” says one of them. “I just wanted
to work, but you feel this constant pressure that, if you don’t
contribute, your job’s at stake. You’re compelled to do this
whether you want to or not.” Says the second: “They will

get the job because he was ‘too political.’ ‘They said I should be aware of what I
am posting online,’ says McKinney.”).
135 See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 131 (“’The economy doesn’t currently pose a
threat to your job. What does threaten your job, however, is another four years
of the same presidential administration,’ Mr. Siegel wrote. ‘If any new taxes are
levied on me, or my company, as our current president plans, I will have no
choice but to reduce the size of this company.’”).
136 Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Election Bosses: How to Stop Employers from
Telling Workers Whom to Vote For, SLATE, Nov. 2, 2012.
137 For examples, see Andy Kroll, CEO of International Corporation Sends Romney
Fundraising Pitch to His Employees, MOTHER JONES, Oct. 25, 2012,
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/10/romney-fundraising-email-ceoincomm-brooks-smith; Arthur Allen, CEO Of ASG, Sent Email Pressuring Employees
To Donate To Mitt Romney, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 20, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/20/arthur-allen_n_1992370.html.
138 Alec MacGillis, Coal Miner’s Donor, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 25, 2012.
139 Id.
140 See id.
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give you a call if you’re not giving. . . . It’s expected you
give Mr. Murray what he asks for.”141
And when Governor Romney visited a coal mine operated by a
Murray-owned company for a rally, a company official
acknowledged that workers were told that attendance at the event
“would be both mandatory and unpaid.”142
Even outside of the realm of electoral politics, employers
might perceive an interest in regulating the off-the-worksite
political speech of their employees. In the well-known Novosel case,
for example, an insurance company fired a claims manager for
“refus[ing] to participate in [a company-supported] lobbying
effort” and privately stating “opposition to the company's political
stand.” 143 Employers often discipline or fire employees who
publicly oppose their company’s position on political issues. 144
And a company might deem it best to fire, or not to hire, an
employee whose political speech is repugnant to the company’s
owner or “alienates coworkers, customers, or political figures” who
regulate the company.145 Such an employee may, but need not,
express especially extreme political views.146
Id.; see also Lisa B. Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace: Using the
First Amendment as Public Policy for Wrongful Discharge Actions, 55 OHIO ST. L.J.
341, 342 (1994) (In 1992, a “CEO sent faxes to regional managers strongly
recommending that they purchase seats at a candidate's fundraiser if they
intended to have a future with the corporation; one who failed to do so lost his
job.”); Lewis Maltby, Office Politics: Civic Speech Shouldn’t Get Employees Fired,
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005 (“William Niess, a Democrat in Wisconsin, refused to
make a political contribution to the party favored by his boss. As a result, he was
fired in 1996.”).
142 Sabrina Eaton, Coal Miners Lost Pay when Mitt Romney Visited their Mine to
Promote Coal Jobs, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 28, 2012; see also Bingham, supra note 141,
at 341 (“During the 1992 presidential campaign, employers required that
employees sit through a presidential candidate's stump speech as part of a
company-wide captive audience.”).
143 Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896 (3d Cir. 1983).
144 See, e.g., Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 75 P.3d 733 (Idaho 2003)
(employee fired for publicly opposing land development project that his
employer supported).
145 Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: Statutory
Protection Against Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POLITICS 295, 301 (2012).
146 See Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 389 (2003) (“Maybe the employee’s political
activities and public statements have been considered extremely offensive (such
as being a grand dragon of the KKK, or speaking out in support of pornography
or pedophilia), and the employer may say it is responding to pressures from
other employees and customers. Other times, the worker’s politics may simply
141
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These practices raise significant concerns from a social
equality standpoint. In each case, an employer is using its
economic power over its employees as leverage to obtain greater
power in the political sphere. Workers, fearful of losing their jobs,
will suppress their own political views or express views with which
they do not agree. 147 The result will be a skewed political
discourse, in which employers’ voices are amplified and workers’
are squelched.148 Where an employee suppresses political speech
that relates to the actions of her employer or industry—such as
speech about health or safety hazards, sharp financial practices, or
the employer’s compliance with regulations addressing harms like
those—the political discourse may lose out on a particularly
I address
distinctive and important perspective. 149
“whistleblowing” speech of this nature in Part II.D. below. But
even where the suppressed speech relates to matters entirely
separate from the workplace, the employer’s ability to translate its
economic power into enhanced political power poses a threat to
social equality.150

be in conflict with those of a boss who prefers to have like-minded people
working for the enterprise.”) (footnote omitted). For a relatively recent example
of an individual being fired for extreme views that seem to have no bearing on
the ability to do the job, see Timothy Noah, Can Your Boss Fire You for Your
Political Beliefs?, SLATE, July 1, 2002 (describing the case of a sewing-machine
operator who was fired by Goodwill Industries in 2002 for supporting the
Socialist Workers Party).
147 See David C. Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and Encouraging Private
Employee Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 913 (1998) (discussing the pressures toward worker self-censorship); Maltby, supra
note 141 (“People need their jobs, and many will sacrifice their rights as citizens
to continue to provide for themselves and their families.”).
148 See Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of
Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 689, 692 (arguing that
“[i]t makes little difference” whether “a person who speaks out is discharged by
a public or private employer,” because “[p]olitical discussion is equally
impoverished, the marketplace of ideas similarly distorted, and respect for the
person no less denied.”).
149 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J.
101, 111 (1995). For a general argument that the law should protect “citizen
employees” who, among other things, bring employer wrongdoing to the
attention of the public, see Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV.
237 (2009).
150 Cf. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 685, 710 (1991) (arguing, from a civic republican perspective, that
“citizens should be protected from employers’ compulsion or penalization of
political activity” and that the law should provide “speedy and effective legal
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2. The Doctrinal Response—Employment law should address
this threat. And it already does to some extent. The courts in most
states recognize a cause of action for wrongful termination against
public policy. 151 But courts have generally not used the public
policy tort to protect workers’ political speech. The one notable
exception is the decision in Novosel, in which the Third Circuit,
sitting in diversity, predicted that Pennsylvania law would protect
an employee against discharge for refusing to engage in a lobbying
campaign sponsored by his employer.152 Subsequent Pennsylvania
cases discredited that prediction, and courts elsewhere have not
taken up the Novosel doctrine. 153 Many state statutes, however,
protect workers’ political speech against retaliation by their
employers. As Professor Eugene Volokh recently showed, “[a]bout
half of Americans live in jurisdictions that protect some private
employee speech or political activity from employer retaliation.”154
But these statutes have widely disparate coverage.155 Connecticut’s
statute is the only one broad enough to apply “the same rules to
private employers as are applied to public employers under the
First Amendment.”156
A social equality perspective suggests that these aspects of
employment law are moving in the right direction, but they do not
go far enough. A focus on social equality suggests the need for a
general prohibition of adverse employment actions for engaging or
refusing to engage in off-the-job political speech—including
political contributions or volunteering. To be sure, an employer
has a number of legitimate and wholly business-related interests in
its employees’ out-of-work speech. As with worker privacy, the
law governing worker speech should take account of those interests
without permitting them simply to trump the interest in social
equality.
remedies from discharge, reduction in job benefits, and other employercontrolled penalties for political activity”).
151 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.01, comment a (Tentative
Draft No. 2 Revised, 2009).
152 Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983).
153 See Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 618-620 (3d Cir. 1992); see
also Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Co., 75 P.3d 733, 738-739 (Idaho 2003) (“[T]he
public policy adopted in Novosel has not been endorsed by any other court, not
even the Pennsylvania state courts within the federal district of the Circuit that
issued Novosel.”); Tiernan v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 506 S.E.2d
578, 589 (W.Va. 1998) (stating that “Novosel is dubious authority today”).
154 Volokh, supra note 145, at 297 (emphasis added).
155 See id. at 309-334.
156 Id. at 311; see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q.
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What are an employer’s financial interests in regulating an
employee’s political speech outside of the workplace and working
hours? I can imagine several. For one thing, customers may
attribute that speech to the employer. If they object to a worker’s
out-of-work speech, they may punish the employer for retaining
the employee who engaged in it.157 Coworkers or managers may
have a difficult time working with an individual who engages in
out-of-work speech that they find offensive or with which they
fundamentally disagree. This may be a particular problem in small
or closely-held companies. Finally, an employer may engage in
political speech of its own solely to enhance its bottom line (which
seems to be what was going on in Novosel itself). As Professor Matt
Bodie explains, “[c]ompanies make political contributions and
spend on political advertising because it’s good for business—their
business.”158 An employer’s speech in this regard can be blunted or
undermined by employees’ out-of-work speech—particularly if the
employees are hired specifically to express the corporation’s
political message or are so high-ranking that their speech (even out
of the office) will likely be attributed by observers to the
corporation.159
Of course, an employer may have more ideological and less
bottom-line-oriented reasons for regulating or compelling its
workers’ speech on political issues. A company may be owned by
staunch opponents or proponents of the war in Afghanistan. If the
owners want to exercise their right, protected by the Supreme
Court in Citizens United and earlier cases, 160 to spend their
company’s treasury to support their preferred cause, they will have
In 1982, for example, the Boston Symphony Orchestra canceled a contract with
Vanessa Redgrave to narrate a performance of “Oedipus Rex” after subscribers
and community members protested Ms. Redgrave’s support for the Palestine
Liberation Organization. See Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855
F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988) (rejecting Redgrave’s civil rights claim but affirming a
judgment in her favor for breach of contract).
158 Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Speech, Corporate Speech, and Political Speech: A
Reaponse to Professor Sachs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 206, 206 (2012).
159 In 1986, for example, the large defense contractor Raytheon fired its chief
lobbyist after he spoke at a press conference and advocated a reduction in
defense spending. See Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1991)
(rejecting the lobbyist’s wrongful termination claim); see generally Helen Norton,
Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of its Workers’ Speech to
Protect its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 41-43 (2009) (describing evidence that
onlookers often attribute the views of one’s associates to oneself).
160 See Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); First Nat’l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
157
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to do so by hiring someone to speak on their behalf. Just as in the
cases of bottom-line-oriented speech, an employer will have an
interest in ensuring that those it hires to engage in ideological
speech do not undermine that message.
Any protection of private employee speech must take
account of legitimate employer interests like these. For example,
such a protection could exempt particularly small employers or
perhaps closely-held or nonprofit corporations. It could exempt the
highest-ranking executive employees whose speech will be “readily
identified with the employer.” 161 It could also exempt cases in
which speaking or refusing to speak on a particular topic can be
regarded as a bona fide occupational qualification. Such a rule
would enable an employer to control the out-of-work speech of a
lobbyist or other individual hired specifically to engage in political
speech without permitting the employer to control every worker’s
speech outside of the workplace.
As in the employment
discrimination context, a BFOQ doctrine would eliminate some of
the employer’s traditional prerogative to define employees’ jobs.
To take a recent example, Starbucks might define the job of a
barista as someone who brews espresso drinks while writing
messages on cups urging a solution to the fiscal cliff, 162 just as
airlines in the 1970s defined the job of a flight attendant as helping
customers get from place to place while appealing sexually to male
business travelers. A BFOQ rule resists an employer’s casual and
opportunistic leveraging of its economic power over the speech of
employees whom it can control simply because of their economic
dependence on the enterprise. But it leaves employers free to hire
individuals specifically for the purpose of speaking on behalf of the
enterprise and to ensure the effectiveness of their speech.
3. Constitutional Questions—There remains the question
whether a law prohibiting private employers from controlling their
workers’ political speech—even with the exceptions I have
suggested—would be consistent with current First Amendment
doctrine.163 After all, the employer’s interests in this context—in
Selmi, supra note 111, at 1054.
See Kevin Drum, Starbucks CEO Should Leave His Baristas Alone, MOTHER JONES,
Dec. 28, 2012, http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2012/12/starbucksceo-should-leave-his-baristas-alone.
163 Cf. Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to
the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537
(1998) (arguing that imposing First Amendment norms on private entities may
actually threaten First Amendment values).
161
162
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avoiding having speech with which it disagrees attributed to it, and
in engaging in political speech of its own—are interests that the
Supreme Court has found to be constitutionally based. These are
complex issues that deserve an article of their own. For now, let me
sketch (far too simplistically) the reasons why I believe a law like
the one I have defended is consistent with current First
Amendment doctrine.
The Supreme Court has held that a state may require a
“business establishment” to associate itself in some ways with a
third party’s speech, at least so long as the views of the speaker
“will not likely be identified with those of the owner”; “no specific
message is dictated by the State”; and the business “can expressly
disavow any connection with the message.”164 A law prohibiting
employers from disciplining workers for off-work speech would
not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, as it would apply no
matter what message the employer or employee wished to express
or suppress. 165 And when an employee speaks about political
issues on her own time, her speech is not likely to be understood as
expressing her employer’s views (at least where she neither was
hired specifically as a spokesperson or lobbyist nor occupies such a
senior position in the company as to be understood as speaking for
it at all times). Indeed, the very existence of a law protecting the
off-work political speech of employees should undercut any
suggestion that that speech could be attributed to the employer.
The Court has explained that “high school students can appreciate
the difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the
school permits because legally required to do so, pursuant to an
equal access policy.”166 The same point applies here. In any event,
164 PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980); see also Rumsfeld
v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006)
(reaffirming this aspect of PruneYard); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 576-577, 580 (1995) (reaffirming this aspect of
PruneYard, but holding that the First Amendment prohibited the state from
requiring operators of “an expressive parade” to include participants expressing
a message with which they disagreed, where inclusion of those participants
would dilute “the parade’s overall message” and disavowal by the parade
operators would be impractical).
165 Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Com’n, 475 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (requiring utility company to include in its billing mailer
statements from third parties chosen specifically because they disagree with the
company’s views is viewpoint-discriminatory and impermissibly burdens the
company’s right to express its views).
166 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65. One cannot, of course, press this point too far without
eliminating any constitutional protection against forced association with
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the employer can always disavow an employee’s off-work
speech—whether through a general disclaimer of responsibility for
anything an employee says outside of the workplace or in response
to a specific act of speech that the employer, customers, or
coworkers find particularly offensive.
In Boy Scouts v. Dale, the Court held that requiring an
“expressive association” to admit to membership an individual
who (in his outside life) vocally disagreed with the association’s
message violated the First Amendment.167 The Court concluded
that such forced membership significantly burdened the
association’s message without serving a sufficiently strong
interest.168 But a commercial enterprise’s hiring and retention of an
employee—at least where the employee is not hired specifically to
express a message—seems a far cry from an expressive
association’s decision to admit an individual to membership.169
To be sure, the Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that the
government may not prohibit a corporation from engaging in
political speech. 170 A corporation can act only through its
employees. To engage in its constitutionally protected political
another’s speech. But in the context of out-of-work speech by ordinary
employees, one need not push the point to the logical limit. Unless such an
individual expressly refers to her status as an employee of a particular employer,
it is fair to insist that the employer not act on the premise that the individual’s
speech will be attributed to it. Cf. Selmi, supra note 111, at 1054 (arguing that,
when the worker does expressly refer to her status as its employee, an employer
may require her to make clear that she speaks only for herself).
167 Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653-654 (2000).
168 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 659; see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 712 (2012) (citing Dale to support its holding
that the First Amendment protects a church’s choice of whom to admit to the
ministry).
169 Cf. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 69 (concluding that permitting military personnel to
recruit at law schools did not violate Dale, because recruiters are “outsiders who
come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to
become members of the school’s expressive association”). The analysis in text
tracks, at a reasonably high level of abstraction, one of the leading defenses of
Dale. Professor Dale Carpenter argues that Dale protects the right against
compelled association in expressive, but not in commercial, activity. See Dale
Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A
Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515 (2001). There is a substantial argument
that Professor Carpenter’s reading of Dale is too broad and unduly limits state
power over even noncommercial associations. See Andrew Koppelman, Should
Noncommercial Associations Have an Absolute Right to Discriminate?, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (2004). If that is so, my proposal should stand on even
firmer constitutional ground.
170 Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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speech, then, a corporation must be free to hire individuals to speak
on its behalf. And it must be free to require those individuals not
to undercut the message it has hired them to express. But that does
not mean that employers have a constitutional right to transform
the speech of all of their employees—even those who are hired to
engage in productive activity quite distinct from expressing a
message—into the speech of the corporation. In the context of
government speech, the Court has held that the government may
hire contractors to express a message and may take measures to
ensure that those contractors do not undercut that message.171 But
it has suggested that the government may not regulate those
contractors—nor, notably, their employees—in their speech outside
of the contract. 172 Similarly, the Court has said that public
employers can regulate out-of-work speech when employees
deliberately seek to link that speech to their employers.173 But it
has not held that public employers can regulate their employees’
off-duty speech when the worker does not seek to draw such a
link.174 Consistent with current First Amendment doctrine, courts
could draw a similar distinction here: between a corporation’s own
political speech, which the government generally may not prohibit,
and the political speech of its employees on their own time, which
the government may regulate the corporation to protect.175
This discussion no doubt glosses over some important
points. But I hope I have shown that a focus on social equality
supports a call for greater protection of private employees’ out-ofSee Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
See id. at 197-199.
173 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004).
174 But cf. Norton, supra note 159, at 18-19 (discussing lower-court cases allowing
cities to sanction police officers for their off-duty speech, though those cases
might be explained as applications of the principle that police officers are the sort
of employees whose speech will always be reasonably attributed by observers to
their government employers).
175 It is true that the speech of many employees will be facilitated by the wages or
salaries they earn, but that does not make their speech constitutionally
attributable to their employers. “All speakers, including individuals and the
media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their speech.
The First Amendment protects the resulting speech, even if it was enabled by
economic transactions with persons or entities who disagree with the speaker’s
ideas.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 905. There is an interesting parallel here with
the current debate over whether employers can be required to offer their workers
insurance policies that cover contraception, though the religious liberty issues in
that debate are sufficiently distinct from the matters I discuss in this article that I
leave them for another day. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception
Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 151 (2012) (addressing those issues).
171
172
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work political speech, and that such protection is at least plausibly
consistent with current First Amendment doctrine.
D. Prohibitions on Retaliation
Employment law contains important, but incomplete,
protections for workers who speak out on their employers’
violations of law. These laws advance social equality in two
respects. First, as I suggested above, they protect the ability of
workers to participate in public discourse in those areas in which
they have the most distinctive contributions to make as employees.
Many courts have therefore applied the public policy tort to
prohibit terminating an employee because she truthfully testified or
participated in an investigation regarding her employer’s
compliance with the law. 176 Any number of federal and state
whistleblowing statutes—most notably the whistleblowing
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 177 —also protect employees
against adverse treatment taken because they reported their
employers for statutory or regulatory violations or financial
improprieties. 178
The antiretaliation provisions of various
workplace statutes also protect employees who oppose or file
complaints against employers’ violations of those statutes.179
176 See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of
Overlapping Obligations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 433, 445-446 (2009) (“All jurisdictions that
recognize the public policy exception apply it where the employee informs a
government agency about her suspicions.”); Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful
Discharge Law and the Search for Third Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1966-1967
(1996) (collecting cases).
177 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; see Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an
Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 376 (2005) (describing SarbanesOxley as the “gold standard in protection of employee whistleblowers”). The
Dodd-Frank Act expanded on Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower protections. See
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall
Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV.
73, 85-95.
178 For
a comprehensive survey of state statutory and common-law
whistleblower protections, and of federal whistleblower statutes enacted as of
2004, see Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers,
and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV.
1029, 1087-1123 (2004).
179 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting employers from discriminating
against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by” Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (prohibiting employers
from “discharg[ing] or in any manner discriminat[ing] against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the exercise by such
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But these laws have significant limitations. Both the public
policy tort and whistleblower statutes are inconsistent in their
coverage.180 Moreover, they typically do not protect employees’
speech to the general public.181 Rather, they are generally limited
to protecting whistleblowing speech made in one of two
circumstances: (1) in conjunction with an investigation or judicial,
administrative, or legislative proceeding182; or in some cases, (2) in
an employee’s communications with her supervisor 183 —though
many do not even reach the latter circumstance. 184
The
antiretaliation provisions of the federal employment discrimination
laws, at least, are broader in their protection of employee speech
that opposes violations of those laws.185
The public policy tort and the whistleblower and antiretaliation laws also serve social equality in a second respect: they
protect workers’ access to the processes for petitioning the state for
redress of grievances and for obtaining the protection of the laws.
Thus, courts in a number of states have held that an employer
engages in wrongful discharge by firing an employee for claiming
worker’s compensation or (during layoff periods) unemployment
benefits.186 The proposed Restatement of Employment Law would
generalize this principle and provide a tort cause of action for
employees who are disciplined for “fil[ing] a charge or claim[ing] a
benefit in good faith under an employment statute or law
(irrespective of whether the charge or claim is meritorious).” 187
And numerous state and federal laws that extend rights to
employee on behalf of himself or others of any right afforded by” the
Occupational Safety and Health Act).
180 See, e.g., Cherry, supra note 178, at 1049 (concluding that “state whistleblower
law is murky, piecemeal, disorganized, and varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction” and that “the federal statutory scheme results in a haphazard
enforcement structure”).
181 Connecticut is the only state that gives employees general free-speech
protection against private employers. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q.
182 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A) & (B), (a)(2) (antiretaliation provision of
Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
183 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(3) (antiretaliation provision of Sarbanes-Oxley
Act).
184 See Lobel, supra note 176, at 445-447.
185 See Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County, 555 U.S. 271 (2009) (reading Title VII’s opposition clause broadly in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the word “oppose”).
186 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 Reporters Notes
comment d (Tentative Draft Revised, 2009) (collecting cases).
187 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02(c) (Tentative Draft Revised,
2009).
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employees contain their own antiretaliation provisions protecting
workers who pursue charges or claims under them.188
An employer that uses its economic power to prevent a
worker from reporting its violations of law threatens social equality
in at least two dimensions: one that relates to dynamics outside of
the workplace, and the other that relates to dynamics within the
workplace. The ability to petition the government for redress of
grievances, seek the protection of the laws, and call another person
to account for violating one’s rights is a core aspect of citizenship in
our democratic polity.189 When employer retaliation forecloses that
ability for a worker, it denies the worker full membership in the
broader community. But even those dynamics that are purely
internal to the workplace matter for social equality. As Professor
Cynthia Estlund has shown, the workplace is a central location in
our society for the development and exercise of citizenship. 190
When an employer can effectively foreclose a worker from seeking
redress for a violation of the worker’s own rights guaranteed by
law, the employer communicates the worker’s subordinate status
clearly and effectively. Retaliation exacerbates and entrenches
hierarchies of status within workplaces, by “prey[ing] on the most
vulnerable” employees, while “simultaneously magnif[ying] the
power of high-status persons” such as owners and supervisors.191
By helping to ensure that workers can report employers’
violations of their legal rights, the legal suite of antiretaliation
protections advances and protects social equality. As the Supreme
Court explained when it interpreted Title IX of the Education
Amendments as including a prohibition against retaliation, the
objective of ensuring individuals effective protection against
discrimination “would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve if
persons who complain about sex discrimination did not have
effective protection against retaliation.” 192 That is because
antidiscrimination laws, like other workplace laws, cannot be
effectively enforced without individual employees’ reports of
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (Fair Labor Standard Act); id. § 660(c)(1)
(Occupational Safety and Health Act); id. § 2615(b)(1) (Family and Medical Leave
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII of Civil Rights Act); id. § 12203(a)
(Americans with Disabilities Act).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 53-54. (explaining why access to such legal
and governmental processes is essential to social equality).
190 See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003).
191 Deborah Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 40 (2005).
192 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 180 (2005).
188
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violations. As Professor Estlund persuasively shows, enforcement
of workplace rights depends on “vigorous encouragement and
protection of individual employees who speak up about rights and
regulatory infractions.”193
But the suite of antiretaliation protections does not yet
provide protection for all employees who claim violations of their
workplace rights. In particular, workers who assert rights under
state law will be denied protection if they live in one of the many
states that does not provide a wrongful discharge cause of action
for retaliation for the exercise of employment rights. A social
equality perspective suggests that the suite of antiretaliation
protections should be expanded to fill that gap. In particular, the
wrongful discharge tort should generally protect employees’
complaints about violations of their legal rights.
As with the other doctrinal areas I have discussed,
employers have legitimate interests here, and the law should take
account of them. For one thing, whistleblowers’ complaints can be
frivolous, asserted in bad faith, or raised in a needlessly adversarial
or disruptive manner.194 Social equality requires that employees be
able to speak out about violations of their workplace rights or their
employers’ other violations of law; it does not require that they be
permitted to use whistleblower laws to harass their employers.
Accordingly, it would be fully consistent with a social equality
approach to accommodate the employer interests here. The law
might do this by explicitly adopting a balancing test. The
Connecticut statute, for example, does not protect conduct that
“substantially or materially interfere[s] with the employee’s bona
fide job performance or the working relationship between the
employee and the employer.” 195 The Connecticut courts have
interpreted that language as incorporating the Connick/Pickering
doctrine from the Supreme Court’s First Amendment case law,
which balances the public interest in the speech against the
employer’s interest in efficient management of the workplace.196
But, as Professor George Rutherglen has persuasively
argued, such a balancing test has serious flaws. “The hard cases
typically reduce to a direct conflict between incommensurable
Estlund, supra note 177, at 376.
See Lobel, supra note 176, at 464-465 (describing how courts have denied
protection to bad faith, frivolous, or needlessly disruptive whistleblowing
speech).
195 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q.
196 See Schumann v. Dianon Systems, Inc., 43 A.3d 111, 121-123 (Conn. 2012).
193
194
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rights: on the part of the employee to talk about what goes on at
work and on the part of the employer to control it.” 197 The
balancing test in employee speech cases thus “turns out, upon
examination, to be an illusory balance between poorly defined
interests.” 198 Professor Rutherglen shows that the result is
systematically to underprotect the employee’s speech interest—the
interest, in my terms, in social equality—while denying certainty
and predictability to both employees and employers.199
A more promising approach would adopt specific subrules
to identify those categories of whistleblowing speech that threaten
legitimate employer interest and can be exempted from protection
without significant harm to social equality.
The proposed
Restatement, for example, would protect whistleblowing
employees only when they have a good-faith belief that the
employer has violated the law. 200 Further limiting employees’
whistleblowing rights, the lower federal courts have accorded
protection under antiretaliation statutes only to those workers who
act on the basis of a reasonable belief that the employer violated the
law.201 These rules recognize that, given the uncertainties of an
employer’s underlying legal obligations, workers need breathing
space to complain without fear that a court will later conclude that
their employers did not violate those obligations. But they also
prevent frivolous and harassing complaints that the law need not
protect to serve social equality.
Professor Orly Lobel contends that antiretaliation law
should take account of employers’ interests in a distinct respect.
She argues that the law should incentivize workers to present
whistleblower complaints to their employers first, and should
privilege them to complain outside of the company only if the
employer fails to provide satisfaction (or to create a process that
can be expected to be responsive to meritorious claims).202 One
model for her approach is the Supreme Court’s harassment

George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in Remedial Perspective, 24 J. L. &
POL. 129, 144 (2008).
198 Id. at 143.
199 See id. at 143-144.
200 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02(c) (Tentative Draft
Revised, 2009).
201 See Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 375, 446-451 (2010).
202 See Lobel, supra note 176, at 461-467.
197
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jurisprudence. 203 That body of law was designed to incentivize
employers to create internal processes that effectively prevent and
respond to harassment and, at the same time, to incentivize
employees to take advantage of those processes. 204 But that
jurisprudence has not lived up to its promise to protect
employees. 205 More generally, Professor Lobel’s argument is
driven by a belief in “new governance” approaches that place a
heavy premium on employer self-regulation.206 But I am skeptical
that such self-regulation can adequately preserve employees’
ability to speak out about violations of law in the workplace.207 To
the extent that Professor Lobel argues that workers should be
protected against employer retaliation when they make internal
whistleblowing complaints, I agree; such retaliation is a major
threat to social equality. But to the extent that she argues that
employers should be empowered to discipline or fire workers who
make reasonable, good-faith complaints to external authorities
about violations of law at the workplace, her proposal would
undermine social equality and should be rejected.
E. Arbitration
The growth of employment arbitration, aided and abetted by
a number of Supreme Court decisions, 208 also raises significant
concerns from a social equality perspective. 209 The doctrinal
implications of those concerns are less clear, however. Critics of
arbitration argue that it operates in a manner that undermines the
rights granted by employment statutes and the common law. 210
See id. at 473-475 (citing, inter alia, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,
805-808 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)).
204 See Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment under Title VII: A
Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41 (1999).
205 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2006).
206 See Lobel, supra note 176, at 470-473.
207 I discuss the reasons for my skepticism in Bagenstos, supra note 205, at 20-40.
208 The most notable of these have been Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that a claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act could be subject to contractually binding arbitration); Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that the Federal
Arbitration Act applies to employment contracts); and 14 Penn Plaza LLC v.
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) (holding that a collective bargaining agreement could
require arbitration of individual employees’ claims under the federal
employment discrimination laws).
209 See Bagchi, supra note 16, at 612-614.
210 See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court’s
Preference for Private Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 695 (1996).
203
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They contend that arbitration favors employers—who, as repeat
players, have an outsized influence on the selection of arbitrators.211
They contend that virtually all of the process that arbitration
removes is process that benefits workers.212 And they note that a
large number of arbitration decisions remain confidential or are
released in only a redacted form, which undermines the publiceducation benefits of litigation. 213 Taken together, one critic has
charged, employment arbitration provisions facilitate “a new
feudal order,” in which contract is “used to create status, or at least
reinforce the lack thereof.”214
These arguments do suggest that arbitration of employment
claims undermines workers’ ability to petition their government for
redress of grievances, obtain the protection of the laws, and call
employers to account. They thus provide reasons to be skeptical,
from a social equality perspective, of the spread of mandatory
employment arbitration. But there is another side to the story.
Many defenders of the practice contend, with some support, that
arbitration is more accessible than are judicial proceedings, so that
in many cases arbitration will provide a more effective means for
individual workers to obtain the protection of the laws than will
the filing of a lawsuit.215 In part for this reason, advocates of justSee Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat-Player Effect, 1
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997); cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights
and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of
Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 430 (2006) (noting various reasons to
think employers have a repeat-player advantage but finding the empirical
evidence “equivocal at best”); but see Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of
Employer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31
RUTGERS L.J. 399, 400-401 (1999) (“As a matter of general practice, the use of
mandatory arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism for employment
discrimination claims has failed to give employers an overall advantage.”)
(footnotes omitted).
212 See Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 829-833 (2009).
213 See Estlund, supra note 211, at 433; Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1672 (2005).
214 Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in
Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1063 (1998); see also Bagchi, supra
note 16, at 614 (“If employers are permitted to use biased arbitration procedures
to evade even those basic background checks on employer power imposed by
law, the resulting situation of unchecked authority magnifies the
disempowerment associated with low status.”).
215 See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559;
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 783 (2008); David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey, & Zev J. Eigen, In
211

49
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/62

50

Bagenstos:

cause termination regimes typically argue that those regimes
should be enforced through a system of arbitration. 216 But the
argument that arbitration is a more effective forum for workers to
vindicate their employment rights remains highly controversial.217
For present purposes, there is no need to assess these
competing claims, which rest largely on empirical disagreements.
Rather, two points are crucial. First, from a social equality
perspective, employment arbitration should be encouraged only if
and to the extent that it advances the ability of workers to obtain
redress for their employers’ violations of their legal rights. That
arbitration may be cheaper or more efficient than a lawsuit cannot
save mandatory arbitration under a social equality analysis unless
the cost savings and efficiencies reduce the barriers to workers’
access to the process.218
Second, given the quite significant threat that arbitration
poses to social equality, courts should be vigilant in ensuring that
arbitration occurs in a procedural context that mitigates that threat.
In particular, courts should not hesitate to invalidate arbitration
provisions that have the effect of keeping meritorious claims from
being decided. The social equality analysis thus provides a basis
for challenging application of the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion219 to employment arbitration.
In holding that a state-law prohibition on class-action bans was
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act,220 the Court there gave
short shrift to the concern that class adjudication (whether in court
or in arbitration) is essential to ensuring that some meritorious

Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing
Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 73 (1999); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum
Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813 (2008) (finding the
empirical evidence inconclusive overall, but finding reason to think that
arbitration is more accessible than litigation for many low-wage employees,
though less accessible than litigation for other employees); cf. Estlund, supra note
211, at 436-437 (arguing that a fair arbitration agreement should benefit many
employees).
216 See supra text accompanying note 94.
217 For a particularly powerful rebuttal, see David S. Schwartz, Mandatory
Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009).
218 This seems to be largely Professor Estlund’s argument. See Estlund, supra note
211, at 426-438.
219 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
220 See id. at 1753.
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claims will be brought at all.221 Whatever one may think about that
concern in the consumer-contract setting of Concepcion itself,222 an
extension of the Court’s analysis to the employment setting would
raise serious social equality concerns.223
Consistent with my analysis, the National Labor Relations
Board’s recent D.R. Horton decision held that employment
arbitration agreements that include class action waivers are
invalid. 224 The Board concluded that such agreements interfere
with employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act to
engage in concerted action (including concerted legal action) for
their mutual aid and protection.225 The Fifth Circuit has stayed the
Board’s decision, however, and lower federal courts have so far
refused to endorse it.226 Nonetheless, a social equality perspective
suggests that the Board was right to hesitate before extending
Concepcion’s holding to the employment context.
F. Child Labor and Maximum-Hours Laws
A number of employment law doctrines can be profitably
understood as advancing a distinct aspect of social equality. These
doctrines ensure that individuals have the time, space, and ability
to participate in democratic citizenship. The significant restriction
of child labor is a prime example.227 Although opponents of child
labor have often made arguments that rest on a notion of
compulsion—that children cannot, as a practical matter, make a
See Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication in a PostConcepcion Era, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203, 1225 (2012); Myriam Gilles & Gary
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012).
222 See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI.
L. REV. 157, 175-182 (2006) (arguing, before Concepcion, that mandatory
arbitration clauses with class-action bans make certain consumer claims
impossible to vindicate); but cf. Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Justice:
Economic
Analysis,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2197013
(Jan.
2013)
(expressing skepticism about this conclusion).
223 See Estlund, supra note 211, at 427-429 (arguing, before Concepcion, that “[b]oth
the effect of negating some nonwaivable employee rights and the apparent
purpose of foreclosing some meritorious claims altogether condemn class action
waiver clauses” in the employment setting).
224 D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012),
225 See id. at 5.
226 See Andrus v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012 WL 5989646 at *4 n.1 (D. Nev., Nov. 12,
2012) (noting that the Fifth Circuit had stayed the Board’s decision).
227 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(l), 212 (child labor provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act).
221
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free choice whether to work228—another significant strand of the
case against child labor rests on a notion of democratic citizenship.
To the extent that children who work too young or for too many
hours lose out on time for education, 229 child labor deprives
individuals of the opportunity to develop the skills and capacity
necessary for full citizenship.230
Our legal and constitutional tradition has long endorsed the
role of education in developing the means to exercise equal
citizenship.
James Madison’s famous letter to W.T. Barry,
“applaud[ing]” what Madison called Kentucky’s “liberal
appropriations” to support “a general system of Education,”
provides an early example:
A popular Government, without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern
ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own
Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.231
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has similarly endorsed the
importance of education to full social and democratic citizenship.232
228 John Stuart Mill described this notion pithily: “Freedom of contract, in the case
of children, is but another word for freedom of coercion.” V JOHN STUART MILL,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, Ch. XI § 30 (1848). For authors collecting
examples of these sorts of arguments, see Kaushik Basu, Child Labor: Cause,
Consequence, and Cure, with Remarks on International Labor Standards, 37 J. ECON.
LIT. 1083, 1093-1095 (1999); and Mark Blaug, The Classical Economists and the
Factory Acts—A Re-Examination, 72 Q. J. ECON. 211 (1958).
229 The degree to which child labor displaces education will no doubt depend on
the age of the child, the number of hours worked, the educational opportunities
that would otherwise be available, and other local social and economic factors.
See, e.g., Basu, supra note 228, at 1093 (discussing studies showing a variety of
effects of child labor on education).
230 Mill again puts the point well. He argues that “[t]here are certain primary
elements and means of knowledge, which it is in the highest degree desirable
that all human beings born into the community should acquire during
childhood,” and that the failure to provide education in those elements breaches
a duty “towards the members of the community generally, who are all liable to
suffer seriously from the consequences of ignorance and want of education in
their fellow-citizens.” V MILL, supra note , Ch. XI § 24.
231 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch18s35.html.
232 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (accepting “that some
degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and
independence” and that “education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and
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When children are forced, by their families’ economic
circumstances, to work at a young age and forgo basic educational
opportunities, they are likely to become locked into an
“underclass” defined by a self-perpetuating cycle of poverty and
inequality.233 Laws restricting child labor are best understood as
preserving the opportunities for all children to become full and
equal citizens.
Child labor may seem a bit remote from the problems of
American employment law today.234 But the scope and application
of maximum-hours laws235 to the general workforce remains a vital
topic in the field. And those laws, too, can be profitably
understood as preserving the space for workers to develop
capacities for participating in social citizenship. Indeed, notions of
social citizenship played a significant part in workers’ agitation for
maximum-hours laws in the decades surrounding the turn of the
Twentieth Century. As one study of workers’ advocacy during the
period shows, “a persistent theme among nineteenth and early
twentieth century shorter hours advocates was that shorter hours
yield enhanced leisure time with which working people could
improve their minds and become better citizens.”236 When workers
repeated the slogan “Eight hours for work, eight hours for rest, and

self-sufficient participants in society”); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483, 493 (1954) (describing education as “the very foundation of good
citizenship”).
233 It was precisely this concern about creating a self-perpetuating underclass that
led the Court to strike down a law barring free public education of the children
of undocumented immigrants. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-223 (1982); see
also id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Children denied an education are
placed at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an
uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve. And when those
children are members of an identifiable group, that group—through the State's
action—will have been converted into a discrete underclass.”); id. at 239 (Powell,
J., concurring) (describing the law at issue as “threaten[ing] the creation of an
underclass of future citizens and residents”).
234 But see Marjorie Elizabeth Wood, Pitting Child Safety Against the Family Farm,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2012 (noting controversy over Obama Administration’s
quickly-abandoned efforts to impose new child labor restrictions on hazardous
agricultural employment).
235 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 207 (maximum-hours provision of the Fair Labor
Standards Act).
236 Matthew S. Bewig, Lochner v. The Journeyman Bakers of New York: The
Journeyman Bakers, Their Hours of Labor, and the Constitution, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
413, 443 (1994).
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eight hours for what we will”237—the “what we will” often referred
to educational and civic activities.238
And the point remains a vital one today. 239 A large
proportion of workers are spending increasing amounts of time at
work, which crowds out their ability to engage in personal
development or participate in the civic life of their community.240
As Professor Todd Rakoff points out, “[t]ime spent not-working”
includes “time spent going to religious services and participating in
civic groups,” as well as “time spent forming political opinions and
working as a citizen.”241 In light of the increasing time spent at
work, Professor Estlund argues that we should treat the workplace
as a central arena for civic and democratic participation.242 But one
can endorse Professor Estlund’s argument as one proposal for
responding to work’s crowding out of civic engagement without
endorsing the underlying trend. Maximum-hours laws provide a
lever to fight that underlying trend.
The problem of overwork appears to be concentrated among
“white collar” workers 243 —many of whom are not especially
wealthy or powerful within or outside of their workplaces.244 A
social equality perspective might therefore make one receptive to
proposals to narrow the FLSA’s white-collar exemptions. 245
E.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People, Legal Regulation and American
Democracy, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 42 (2011).
238 See Bewig, supra note 236, at 443-447.
239 See TODD. D. RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PURPOSE: LAW AND THE BALANCE OF
LIFE 68 (2002) (“In the present day, the fundamental reason to set a legal limit to
work time is to make time available for other important social activities.”).
240 See, e.g., RAKOFF, supra note 239, at 169.
241 RAKOFF, supra note 239, at 68.
242 See ESTLUND, supra note 190.
Along similar lines, Professor Laura
Rosenburyargues that we should treat the workplace as an important locus of
friendships and intimate ties. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 117 (2011).
243 See RAKOFF, supra note 239, at 77-80.
244 See Adam T. Klein, Mark R. Humowiecki, Tarik F. Ajami & Cara E. Greene,
The DOL’s New FLSA White Collar Exemption Regulations and Working with the DOL
on FLSA Actions, 10 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459 (2006) (noting that under
the new Department of Labor regulations the white-collar exemptions can apply
to an employee with a salary as low as $23,660 per year). For a good discussion
of the application of these exemptions to retail store managers—many of whom
make little more than minimum wage—see Drew Frederick, Comment, Exempt
Executives? Dollar General Store Managers’ Embattled Quest for Overtime Pay Under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 277 (2011).
245 To be sure, the problem of crowding out civic life exists for workers who are
covered by the FLSA as well. See Shirley Lung, Overwork and Overtime, 39 IND. L.
237
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Commentators have suggested a number of possibilities in this
regard. Union lawyer Scott Miller proposes replacing the whitecollar exemptions with one, modeled on the “key employee”
exemption under the Family and Medical Leave Act, that would
exclude the top 10 percent of an employer’s workforce (defined by
salary) from maximum-hours coverage.246 Sociologist Juliet Schor
similarly proposes allowing employers to “exempt the top 20% of
their workforce from the 40-hour week standard, but that they be
required to designate an alternate standard of weekly and annual
hours for this 20%.”247 Professor Rakoff proposes eliminating the
white-collar exemptions for those currently exempt workers who
“either have regular hours or already keep track of their hours for
business purposes.”248 He would continue to exempt only those
“high-level employees who work disparate and irregular hours
without any ordinary reason to keep track of them.”249
These various proposals have their strengths and
weaknesses from a policy perspective. But the problem is even
more complex than that. As Professor Deborah Malamud’s
research has shown, the boundaries of the white-collar exemptions
have both material and symbolic effects, and these may point in
different directions. 250 Although limiting the application of the
white-collar exemptions will tend to advance social equality by
freeing up more time for newly-covered workers to spend “as they
will,” it may at the same time undermine that effect by sending the
message that those workers should be treated as having a lower
status more generally. A social equality perspective cannot answer
the question of how these considerations ultimately balance against
each other.251 But I hope I have shown that it helpfully highlights a
key factor that policymakers must take into account in elaborating,
applying, and considering reforms to the Fair Labor Standards Act.
REV. 51 (2005) (responding to the problem by arguing for a statutory right to
refuse overtime).
246 See Scott D. Miller, Work/Life Balance and the White-Collar Employee Under the
FLSA, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 5 (2003).
247 Juliet B. Schor, Worktime in Contemporary Context: Amending the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 157 (1994).
248 RAKOFF, supra note 239, at 81.
249 RAKOFF, supra note 239, at 82.
250 See Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in
New Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212 (1998).
251 It does suggest, however, that Professor Malamud is probably correct in
urging that it is “time to genuinely rethink the FLSA and its upper-level
exemptions, not merely to ‘simplify’ them or remake them to maximize employer
‘flexibility.’” Id. at 2319-2320.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have offered an egalitarian theory of
individual employment law. I have argued that employment law
can be profitably understood as serving the interest in promoting
social equality—and that its rules can be analyzed, defended, and
critiqued based on the degree to which they advance that interest.
Like the rules of employment discrimination law, which also
promote social equality, I have argued that rules of individual
employment law are justified even if they impose costs on
employers. Each employer, I have argued, has an obligation to
spend reasonable sums to avoid contributing to social inequality.
And I have argued that employment law can draw on the
techniques employment discrimination law uses to ensure that
particular employers are not called upon to bear too heavy a
burden.
I have showed how the social equality theory illuminates a
number of key issues in employment law—from the field’s most
enduring questions (Is employment-at-will the correct baseline rule
for job termination?) to those that are especially prominent today
(Should we protect employees’ off-work speech and actions?). The
social equality theory thus provides a fitting alternative to existing
theories of employment law, which focus either on promoting
economic efficiency or on avoiding a hazily defined notion of
exploitation. Social equality offers an attractive overarching theory
of individual employment law, one that offers traction in
addressing important doctrinal issues.
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